




Und alles kam wie es kommen musste
Ultee, W.C.; Luijkx, R.
Publication date:
1996
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Ultee, W. C., & Luijkx, R. (1996). Und alles kam wie es kommen musste: In Amsterdam, Berlin, Budapest,
Frankfurt, Riga, and Vienna? Jewish-Gentile intermarriage 1900-1940. (WORC Paper; Vol. 96.08.015/6).
Oldendorff Research Institute.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.






aper ~ N IIIIIIIV~IIIIUI II~I I~I N llilllll lllful
Und Alles Kam
Wie Es Kommen Musste
in Amsterdam, Berlin, Budapest,




Work and Organiration Rnsercb Centx
UND ALLES KAM
WIE ES KOMMEN MUSSTE-
in Amsterdam, Berlin, Budapest,






August 1996, revised version
~ So many persons provided sug~estions that we cannot thank each and everyone here
personally. Address all correspondence [o Wout Ultee, Department of Sociology, Faculty of
Social Sciences, University of Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, Netherlands; e-
mail: w.ultee(i?maw.kun.nl.
PROLOGUE
Georg Hermann Borchardt, born in Berlin 1871 and died 1943 in Auschwitz, wrote a
novel called Jettchen Gehert and a sequel entitled Henriette Jacoby. Published in 1906
and 1908 and bearing Borchardt's pen name Georg Hermann, both books became steady
sellers and gained acclaim as finely-penciled bitter-sweet realism.z The story they tell is set
in Berlin 1839 and 1840. It is about the clash between two Jewish families over the
marriage of Jettchen, who was raised by her uncle Salomon Gebert and his wife Rickchen
Jacoby after the death of her father in 1815 in the war against France.
Jettchen's favorite uncle is the bachelor Jason Gebert. Jason wished to make his living as a
painter, but his father objected. He was destined to become, like his grandfather, jeweler to
the Prussian court. However, he was crippled in 1813 in the war against France, and was
jailed as a demagogue in 1820. Since his release, he reads journals and puts down Hegel-
humans are endowed with reason, but horses are more agreeable. Jason sees the Geberts'
standing declining. His brother Ferdinand sells carriages, and his brother Salomon, who
married the sister of his brother's wife, textiles. Ferdinand is a little more cultured than
Salomon, and decidedly less so than Jason. Salomon praises the printing quality of a
Moses Mendelssohn inherited from his father, Ferdinand laments that Nathan der Weise is
not staged any more. According to Jason, only Jettchen still does honor to the Geberts. She
bonows Walter Scott trom the library rather than, as Aunt Rickchen would have it,
Eugène Sue. However, Jason foretells that Jettchen will yield to the Jacobys.
After being introduced by .lason to Jettchen on Berlin's K~nigstrassc, and a dinner in
Salomon's home, Friedrich Kdssling~octor of philosophy and contributor to periodicals-
seeks Jettchen's hand in marriage. Then, as the seasons change, matters take their course.
Jettchen's kin convenes. "He is nothing, and he has nothing." When Jason counters that
' In Germany until 1934 Jettchen Gehert sold I 66,000 and Henriette Jacoby 102,000 copies.
Jettchei~ Gehert was translated into nine languages. An English version was published in 1924
under the title of Hetty Geyhert by Allen and Unwin Ltd. in London and G.H. Doran Comp. in
New York (Van Liere 1974). Jettchen Gehert is currently available as a paperback from
Rowohlt, Reinbek bei Hamburg.
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love always has been a matter of consideration among the Geberts, Fcrdinand ret~rts "1
would rather that Jettchen does not marry, lhan that shc takes a Chrislian." J~isuu lcll~
K~ssling that the Geberts are proud of not having been baptized in return for a Unn.
Jettchen, who believes that people do not fully have it in their power to shape their own
life, eventually agrees to marry the uncouth aspiring leather merchant Julius Jacoby, a
cousin from Benschen in Posen who is not her cousin. At the end of Jettchen Gebert, she
runs away from her wedding party, on the last pages of Henriette Jacoby she commits
suicide.
To accent the condition transforming Jettchen Gebert into Henriette Jacoby, the story teller
repeats the phrases "It happened, as it was bound to happen" and "And everything
happened, as it was destined to happen." In the final years of Imperial Getrnany, these
phrases became bywords, and they remained so in the Weimar Republic. Then they sank
into oblivion, to be unearthed in 1985 for an exhibition on the contribution of German
.Iewry to German culture since the 18`h century (Grubel and Roters 1985).3 There it was
added that during the 20`~' century so much happened that never should have happened.
SOCIOLOGY AND 20'h CENTURY EUROPE: SUPPLEMENTING QUESTIONS
ON CLASSES AND THE EXTENSION OF SOCIAL RIGHTS WITH
QUESTIONS ON CULTURAL MINORITIES AND THE LOSS OF CIVIL
RIGHTS
Sociology's research on the recent past of European nations shows that the shift from
voting privileges for the wealthy to universal suffrage and the ensuing power of left-wing
parties (Lenski 1966), fostered the extension of social rights (Korpi 1989), smaller income
disparities (Hewitt 1977), more open classes (Ganzeboom, Luijkx, and Treiman 1989) and
`According to Nussbaum ( 1987, p.410), the title of this exhibition - Jettchen Gebert's Children -
turned Hermann's brain child into a symbol of the failed integration of German-speaking Jewry.
The phrase "Es kam wie es kommen musste" also appears in the first chapter of Theodor
Fontane's E~ Briest from 1895.
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ultimately fewer strikes (Hihbs. .Ir. 1978), lower labor union membership (Western 1995),
and less class-based voting (Lipset 1981, p. 505). For modern Europe, the Marxist idea of
history as strife hetween classes has not been upheld.
Other exceptions to the notion that recent European history is dominated by class
struggles, have received less attention from sociologists. Indeed, these occurrences support
the 1-[egelian idea that wars between nations decide the fate of individuals. If the study of
20`h century societies includes the relations between them, two wars stand out in which
millions of civilians and military were killed, and since societies consist of unequal classes
cmd of culturally central and peripheral groups, the lot of adherents to various religions
deserves attention. Early in the 20`h century, Armenians were sent on death mal~ches
through the Ottoman empire. During World War II, Jews from all over the Continent were
deported to extermination camps built by Germany. At the end of the 20`~ century, Serbs
cleansed Bosnia by executing Muslims.
In contrast to questions about the introduction of universal suffrage and the extension of
social rights, questions about the denial of civil rights to specific culturally peripheral
groups-religious, linguistic, or otherwise-received low priority in the study of
contemporary European societies.`~ For example, little is known about the effects of
differences between the countries of the European Union in the legal status of immigrants
for the eventual integration of newcomers. And although research has shown that equal
political rights do not make for identical economic outcomes, discrepancies between de
jure and c!c ~acto positions are still something of an unproblem. For instance, sociologists
extensively studied the 1917 revolution in Russia which was supposed to do away with
merely formal treedoms, but they have written few of the existing books on the Gulag. In
addition, the explanation of the import of individual rights in industrial nations most
' Sociology did answer questions about the denial of political rights to blacks in the United States.
As Jensen (1978) arbued, the persistence of separate races in the United States is a cultural
phenomenon, since blacks and whites would have amalgamated without norms against marriages
between people differing in skin color.
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influential in sociology, Marshall's (1949) theory on citizenship, suffers from several
~lil7icultics.
To begin with, Marshall's theory does not fare well in comparative research. It held that
the rise of social rights in the United Kingdom after World War II was the latest phase in
an evolution covering 250 years. First there were civil rights, which contributed to
universal political rights, and these rights in their turn led to social rights. Yet, as Flora and
Heidenheimer (1981) pointed out, social rights became established in Germany in the
l 880s-that is, before political rights became universal. Secondly, Marshall supplemented
the question of how rights expanded in the past, with the question of the limits beyond
which the drive towards more individual rights cannot pass, but did not analyze legal
reversals. A specitic case was the gerrymandering in Northern Ireland from the 1920s to
the 1960s which for Catholics to some extent rendered ineffective their right to vote
(Whyte 1990). Lastly, Marshall's listing of civil rights appears uneven. Apart from the
right to a fair trial, it includes economic rights-such as the right to own property and the
freedom of occupation-plus various others. However, one civil right was not explicitly
mentïoned by Marshall. It is the right of a person of a certain denomination to marry a
person of another faith. The 1935 Nuremberg Laws revoked that right by forbidding
marriages between Jews and Gentiles.'
This paper is concerned with the right to marry someone irrespective of their religion. Its
questions focus the extent to which this right remained unexploited or resulted in Jewish-
Gentile marriages, and the factors influencing their incidence. To this end, time series for
six European cities are studied. These towns-all but one capitals, each with a sizable
proportion of Jewish inhabitants, and together varying in their timing of Jewish legal
' Althou~~h restricting a right of Jews, this Gennan law also limited an Aryan right. In 1967, in
LOVIiI~~ r. 6'irKi~riu, the Supreme Court of the United States of America declared that laws in 16
states prohibiting marriages between persons ofdifferent race were unconstitutional. Virginiás
defense adduced an I 883 Supreme Court ruling that since both white and negro were equally
punished, no discrimination took place. In 1967 the Supreme Court judged that measures which
restrict the rights of citizens on account of race are unconstitutional (Time 1967).
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~mancipation-are Amsterdam in the Netherlands, Berlin and Frankfurt-on-the-Main in
Germany, Budapest in Hungary, Riga in Latvia, and Vienna in Austria. Cross-tabulations
of the faith of husbands and wives for all marriages concluded in one year, were taken
from official statistics. The longest series pertains to Budapest in 1900-1943. The series
for Berlin and Frankfurt continue into the period Hitler ruled as chancellor; those for
Amsterdam and Vienna include some years of German occupation. The shortest series
covers Riga in 191 1-1938. Table 1 gives population numbers and percentages of Jewish
inhabitants.
-- Table 1 about here --
The background of thïs paper's research questions comprises two incompatible ideas,
whose lineages were traced by Katz (1972, 1975, 1980).~ The first holds that the
separation of Church and State and Jewish legal emancipation inexorably lead to full
economic equality, social acceptance by Gentiles, and the eventual disappearance of
,lewry. Voltaire, who was not so enlightened in Jewish matters, held this notion; so did
Dohm, the Gentile who in 1781 coined the tenn Jewish emancipation, and Mendelssohn, a
founder of the Huskuluh. When dealing with the objection that changes were not fast and
vast, this belief in an irreversible trend was supplanted with the hypothesis of gradually
eroding anti-Semitic prejudices among the population at large.
The second background notion of this paper holds that resistance to Jewish emancipation
in once-predominantly-Christian societies is inevitable, and that unsuccessful Gentile
attempts to revoke legal equality for Jews necessarily provoke ever more tumultuous anti-
Semitic outbursts. Acknowledging that anti-Semitism was not manifest in some European
states, this idea was expanded by the proposition that the longer anti-Semitism remains
latent in a country, the more violence will eventually occur. [n 1896, Herzl evoked this
belief ofan immutable movement, and since the end of World War II, it has been held that
'' An ad~anced version ofthis opposition is formed by Goldscheider and Zuckerman's (1984)
models of assimilation and transfonnation.
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the signs of the final solution were there, in all European countries and frorn the beginning
of.lewish legal emancipation, t~~r anyone to see.
Although these views contradict one another, they agree that things happen as they are
bound to happen.~ This paper studies time series bearing on both, what may be called
predestinarian notions. However, it seeks a middle ground by stating hypotheses on
conditions increasing or decreasing the chances of Jewish-Gentile integration and on
circumstances modifying the strength and direction of trends in this likelihood. It probes
these probabilistic propositions by taking the extent to which Gentiles and Jews marry
each other as an indication of their integration. In this way, it addresses the question of the
degree to which things always and everywhere did happen as they were bound to happen:
The following section of this paper reviews Jewish emancipation in 19`" century Europe
and Jewish exclusion in Europe in the first part of the 20`" century. In subsequent sections,
we outline probabilistic hypotheses on differences between and trends within cities and
unify them by deriving them from a small number of assumptions; will present the data;
and then, trends in the chances of Jewish-Gentile marriage are traced. In the last section,
results are discussed by returning to the question of discrepancies between de jure and de
facto positions.
~ From a logical point of view, these two ideas are not identical to Popper's (1957: 128) absolute
trends - that is, unconditional prophecies - although there are similarities. The first idea sees legal
emancipation as a condition making for economic equality and social integration, the second one
sees Christianity as a ground for anti-Semitic prejudices and violence. However, both ideas deny
that there are other conditions under which the trend they conditionally predict might be modified
or reversed. In addition, the first one outlaws a reversal of legal emancipation, the second one
forbids a demise of Chrístianity. .
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THE JEWS OF EUROPE: GRADUAL EMANCIPATION AND RENEWED
EXCLUSION
Francex was the first Continental country to proclaim that all its subjects have freedoms to
be respected by the state. After the declaration of human rights in 1789, the question arose
whether Jews were French citizens. It took two years to answer it in the affirmative
(Badinter 1989). In Alsace, the debate was about the right of Jews to marry Jews. To limit
the number of Jews, according to older Letters of Patent, Jews could only marry with the
King's permission. Elsewhere in France, friends and foes of Jewish emancipation
advocated mixed marriages (Szajkowski 1957). The full freedom to marry became legally
ascertained with the Code Civi! of 1804. It gave precedence to civil marriage above church
marriage. Before 1789. Jews could not belong to guilds or occupy public office. A poll tax
on Jews had been abolished in 1784.
Human rights came to the Dutch Republic in 1795. When its National Assembly debated
the effects of their adoption, Amsterdam-the Dutch town with the highest percentage of
Jewish inhabitants-argued against Jewish emancipation. [n that city, where no barrier had
been placed on the number of Jews that could marry and no Jewish tax was exacted,y Jews
had been excluded fornially from guilds and public office. In the 1796 vote, Amsterdam
lost. Another issue was whether Jewish emancipation had annulled the 1656 ban on
marriages between Christians and Jews (Huussen Jr 1975, pp. 103-107). The 1796 answer
was yes. In 1809, a translation ot the ('ude ('ivil became law. Later laws, too, never
regarded denominational differences as an impediment to marriage. In 1813, after the
French left the Netherlands, Amsterdam's rurnussim demanded restoration of the
x Sources for the I 9th century were Jiidisches Le.rikon (1927) and .F,ncyclnpuediu Juduicu (1972).
They chart constitutions, and mostly omit laws which authorize marriages between Gentiles and
Jews. The latter descriptions were taken from Ruppin (1934: 316-317). Uates of Anti-Jewish
legislation in the 20th century were generally taken from the Encvclopediu ~~f thc~ Holocuust
(1990).
~' In 1614, the Portuguese Jews of Amsterdam gained the right to their own graveyard on the
condition that they would pay a certain amount of money for every Protestant church passed by a
funeral procession. This tax was abolished in 1721.
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ordinances in force hcl~ire 1795. "hhey were supported in this by the city of Amsterdam,
but the request was rejecte;d as contrary to the ncw constitution (Ue Leeuw 1987, 1988).
The Jews of Frankfurt-on-the-Main had gained equal rights in 1811, after the city's
incorporation in Napoleon's Rhine Confederation. However, in 1815 the Vienna Congress
affirmed the restoration of earlier anti-Jewish laws. In 1824. limits were re-imposed on the
number of Jews that could marry other Jews and on the number of Jews in specific trades.
Jews also remained excluded from public office. Nevertheless, no poll tax was re-instated.
In 1836, occupational liabilities on .fews were removed. The revolution of 1848 failed.
Jews remained barred from politics, and some constraints on marrying endured. In 1853,
Jews gained the right to vote on the same terms as Gentiles, but not the right to be elected.
Full emancipation was attained in 1864. Of all the cities considered here, Frankfurt was
the only one to have known a ghetto in the legal sense. It was destroyed by French cannons
in 1796 and officially abolished in 1824 (Heuberger and Krohn 1988).
In Prussia's capital Berlin, after Napoleon had defeated Prussia at Jena, Jews had gained
equal rights in most matters. However, the 1812 edict postponed a decision about their
right to public positions. After Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo, it was interpreted very
narrowly. [n 1822, Jews were explicitly excluded from public office. 1n addition, the 1812
edict did not apply to the whole of Prussia: in Posen older laws were valid. These forbade
Jews to trade in leather, amongst other things. In 1833, a law was announced for Posen,
dividing Jews into a small proportion of citizens and a large proportion of persons
deprived of basic rights (Toury 1977). From 1812, Jews fought in the Prussian army. In
the Prussian constitution of 1850, Jews gained the right to hold high positions in the army
and the right to occupy other public posts. .fewish emancipation was part of the 1869
constitution of the North German Confederation and of Gerniany's 1871 constitution. The
1875 marriage laws of Gerniany, unlike the earlier ones of Frankfurt and Prussia, did not
view religious differences as an impediment to marriage. [n 1882, the Berliner BeweKung
peaked in a petition pressing for the exclusion of Jews trom public positions. It was signed
by 250,000 people and rejected by parliament.
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In Austria-Hungary during the 1780s, Emperor Joseph II issued various Tolerunzpatente.
They abolished a poll tax levied on Jews and limited the number of Jews that could live in
Budapest and Vienna and the number of Jews that could marry in various parts of the
empire; Jews also remained excluded from public office. Francis I re-introduced a poll tax
on Jews. The Vienna Congress refused to upgrade the status of the Jewish population in
Austria-Hungary. Restrictions on the settlement ofJews in Budapest were dropped in
1840, as well as limits on the freedom of occupation. The 1848 revolution abolished
Jewish taxes in Austrïa-Hungary. A proposal allowing Jews to serve in public functions
was adopted by the Hungarian parliament but rejected by the Hungarian King and Austrian
Emperor. In Austria, the right of Jews to acquire property remained limited until 1867.
That year's Ausxleich resulted in a new constitution for the whole of Austria-Hungary. It
stated that the enjoyment ofevery civil and political right was not dependent on any
religion whatsoever, and annulled each and every existing law incompatible with that
stipulation. Hungary introduced civil marriage in 1895, thus making marriages between
Christians and Jews a legal option. Until the Anschluss in 1938, Austrian law followed the
principle of obligatory church marriage, and according to Paragraph 64 of the Austrian
Civil Law marriages between Christians and non-Christians were not allowed. Although,
this law did permit a Natzivilehe, involving at least one person with no religion.
From 1710 to 1917, Riga was part of Russia. In 1804, Czar Alexander l denied all Jews in
annexed Poland the right to settle beyond the borders of former Poland. As Riga was
outside the Pale of Settlement, its Jewish population remained small. In 1841, the first
Jews oftícially settled in Riga. From 1860, Czar Alexander II granted Jews with useful
occupations the right of residence throughout Russia. Jewish-Gentile marriages were
forbidden. When Germany defeated Russia in World War I, Riga became the capital of
independent Latvia. Jews now had equal legal status. In 1934, Ulmanis became dictator.
He inclined toward Nazi Germany, curtailed the autonomy of Jewish schools, and
restricted Jewish economic activity by a permit system (Bobe 1971, p. 72). In 1940, Latvia
was invaded by the Soviet Union, in 1941 Germany occupied Latvia. The killing of Jews
began at once-by the Germans and the Latvian Thunder Cross.
11
Hungary was the first E;uropean country where the legal status of Jews deteriorated during
the 20`~' century. In 1920, a bill was passed limiting the percentage of Jews in institutions
of higher learning to six. In 1929, after the League of Nations intervened, constraints were
softened. In 1938, the so-called First Jewish Law restricted the percentage of Jews in
certain occupations to 20, and the Second Law of 1939 to five. In 1941, the Third Jewish
Law banned Jewish-Gentile marriages (Katzburg 1981). In March 1944, Germany invaded
Hungary, and on March 22 a pro-German government was installed in Budapest. By early
July 1944, half of all Hungarian Jews had been deported.
In Germany in 1933, shortly after Hitler became chancellor, a law was adopted authorizing
the dismissal of non-Aryan civil servants. A law of September 15, 1935, deprived Jews of
their status as citizens of Germany, and prohibited new marriages between Aryans and
Jews. In 1938, Jews had to declare any wealth above the amount of 5,000 marks and this
could be appropriated by the state to stimulate the economy. On July 1, 1943, Germany
was declared judenrein. With Austria's Anschluss to Germany, marriages between Aryans
and Jews became forbidden in Austria. Half of all German and two-thirds of all Austrian
Jews migrated before World War II.
The Netherlands was invaded by Gennany in May 1940. In Amsterdam in early March
1942, some 50 Jews were arrested who had notified the civil registrar of their intent to
marry Gentiles. The Jewish Council stated in the Joodsche Weekblad of March 27, 1942
that it had been told by the German authorities concerned, that marriages between Jews
and non-Jews were forbidden (Presser 1969). The first train to Auschwitz left on July 15,
1942.
One of the few cases in Nazi times of a successful protest by German Gentiles against
anti-Semitic measures by their leaders, involved Jewish-Gentile marriages. On February
27, 1943, the last Jewish persons in Berlin were taken by the Gestapo and SS from their
work places, and grouped according to Nazi categories. Jews married to Gentiles were
locked into a building in the Rosenstrasse, to be deported to concentration camps. Word of
this reached their Gentile spouses, who protested for several days in the Rosenstrasse by
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velling "Give us back our husbands." On March 6, 1943, Goebbels ordered the release of
some 2,000 Jews in mixed marriages (Stoltzfus 1989).
-- Table 2 about here --
Tables 2 summarizes this section. The first two columns pertain to the 19`" century;
column 1 gïves the year of equal political rights, column 2 indicates the year in which
people gained the right to conclude a religiously mixed marriage. The years mentioned
should not be assumed to be big breaks; laws sometimes legalized already existing
situations, and it is possible that they were applied gradually. However, there is no
indication in any of the cities cited in this paper, that Jewish legal emancipation during the
19`" century simply solemnized what had in any case already happened. To what degree
people used their new right to conclude Jewish-Gentile marriages, is one ofthe research
question in this paper, as is the occurrence of a drop in the number of Jewish-Gentile
marriages before the introduction of laws forbidding them in the 20`" century. Columns 3
and 4 of table 2 pertain to the 20`" century. Column 3 lists the year in which the legal status
of .lews began to deteriorate, column 4 gives the year in which laws against Jewish-Gentile
intennar-riage were introduced.
EXCLUSION AND ISOLATION, EMANCIPATION AND INTEGRATION
Given the previous section, it is obvious how some of the hypotheses to be presented in
thïs sectïon will run. We did not aim to formulate novel ones; we searched the literature
for existing ones and interesting parallels. Instead of listing a number of disparate
hypotheses, we molded what we found into one whole by deriving all our hypotheses from
a limited number of assumptions. In this way, we will demonstrate that some current
hypotheses only invoke certain kinds of factors.~~ We also hope that in this way long-
~~ Given the preponderance of historians in the literature on Jewish-Gentile relations, opportunity
factors have received far less attention than motivational factors. Our systematization of current
hypotheses seeks to remedy this.
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standing statements may be somewhat improved. We begin with three hypotheses
invoking the year in which certain laws were adopted; we then explain them as predictions
on opportunities and barriers, and derive two additional hypotheses on the opportunities
that people had to intermarry. Expanding the hypothesis that the behavior of individuals
depends upon their opportunities into the hypothesis that inclinations are important too,
we obtain two hypotheses on the aversíons or wishes of Jewish persons to outmarry, and
three on the desires or dislikes of Gentiles. ~~ At the end of this section, we say why we did
not state certain current hypotheses. It should be clear that testing a high number of
hypotheses on time series for six cities is difficult.
The passage of time
Our first hypothesis holds that the legal exclusion of Jews isolates them from Gentiles.
This proposition seems trivial but has some substance. To begin with, the interpretation of
prohibitions may alter. We will see later that Austrian marriage law after World War I was
not what it seemed. In addition, it is not logically necessary that the Nuremberg laws were
accompanied by a drop in the number of Jewish-Gentile marriages; perhaps these
marriages were avoided before these laws were promulgated. Our exclusion hypothesis
yields the falsifiable prediction that in the years shortly before the introduction of laws
forbidding Jewish-Gentile marriages, the chances that these marriages would take place
were well above nil, dropping only afterwards. They were also high before the legal status
of Jews began to deteriorate otherwise. ~`
According to another proposition, Jewish legal emancipation fosters the integration13 of
Jews and Gentiles. Taking intermarriage as an indicator of integration and supposing that
" By doing so, we execute the program of a rational-choice sociology.
'~ Michman (1987, p.21) hints at the opposite hypothesis when stating that the Nuremberg laws
"did not change much in the actually existing relations."
" We take integration and assimilation to be different phenomena. Integration involves the
creation ofties of various kinds between groups (Durkheim 1897). Assimilation refers to the
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it takes time before legal possibilities turn into options perceived as real by actors, it may
be derived that the longer ago a city's Jews were emancipated, the more marriages between
Jews and Gentiles will occur in this city. This hypothesis was assessed negatively by Katz
(1973, pp. 202-205) for the 19`h century. In the period after emancipation studied by Katz,
even in countries where Jews were economically well-off, Jews stayed conspicuously
separate, and when and where civil marriage was introduced, the chances of intermarriage
remained small. However, up to now the phrasing of our hypothesis leaves open how
quickly equal rights make for integration. The effect ofemancipation on integration need
not amount to a strong immediate off-on effect, nor need it increase evenly as time goes
by. At first, the chances of integration may rise minimally, then substantially, to flatten out
tinally, not always at the point of full integration or random mating.14 Of Hyman's (1991,
p. 51) sample of 607 marriages involving at least one Jewish person concluded in various
Alsacian towns during the first part of the 19`~' century, three were mixed. Hyman (1991,
p. 4) holds that Jewish intellectuals and upwardly-striving bnurgeoi.c were eager to
integrate in society, whereas rank and file Jews were to be affected by emancipation much
later. This finding tallies with general theories holding that social changes occur as silent
revolutions (Inglehart 1977): long term changes in mass behavior and public opinion are
the result of cohort replacement, not the outcome of period effects. Thus a more
informative version of our c~muncipation hypolhesis holds that the impact of legal
emancipation on intermarriage is strongest after some decades. It is worthwhile testing it
on data for 1900-1940. It also may be wondered whether the short-term effects of
emancipation will be weaker in countries where it came first and stronger in countries that
adopted emancipation later.
process of one group disappearing into another. We hold that assimilation may not only be viewed
as the final phase of integration - as is often done - but sometimes (when laws forbid
intermarriage) also as a preceding phase. Isolation is the opposite of integration.
~a It is not logically necessary tha[ intermarriage between a smaller and a larger group leads to the
disappearance of the smaller. According to I 895 Hungarian law, persons agreeing to a mixed
marriage are to state in advance the denomination of eventual children. lf they did not do so, sons
were given the faith of their father, daughters that oftheir mother.
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Yet another proposítion highlights the time elapsed since Jewish-Gentile marriages
became legally possible. From columns 1 and 2 in table 2, which may be said to provide
the initial conditions for applying our emancipation hypothesis and our murriagc~-laws
hypothesis, it is clear that these rankings do not coincide. If states leave marriage fully in
the clerical jurisdiction-as it was at the beginning of modern times-and if the clergy
refuses to marry persons of different denominations, then no religiously mixed marriage
can be agreed upon. They can be contracted if states force the clergy to wed persons or if
states begin concluding man iages themselves. Our marriage-laws hypothesis, already
suggested by Ruppin ( 1934), says that the longer it has been legally possible in a city for a
Jewish and a Gentile person to marry each other, the higher the chances of Jewish-Gentile
marriages in this city will be.
All our statements up to now take a city as the prime unit-its laws have effects, its
inhabitants are affected-and hence operate on the macro leveL They may be derived from
the individual proposition that persons do things they are allowed to do. If we generalize
this into the hypothesis that the more opportunities people have to do something, the more
likely they are to do it, and concretize this proposition again, we will arrive at two more
hypotheses. They may be seen as detailing what goes on between de jure permission to
intermarry and defacto changes in patterns of intermarriage.
Opportunities
According to Blau and Schwartz (1984) persons marry each other because of the
opportunity they have to meet each other. Now, it is known that the Jewish inhabitants of a
city tend to live in certain quarters, and Gentiles in others. Thus our hypothesis runs: the
weaker the residential segregation of Jews and Gentiles is in a city, the more likely are
Jews and Gentiles to intermany. This residential-segregationhypothesis echoes the
finding of Lieberson (1961) in ten big cities in the United States in 1930: an immigrant
group's residential segregation limits its degree of intermarriage. If legal emancipation
does not make for less residential segregation, intermarriage will not increase.
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Our next hypothesis regards not only living closely together as a chance for people of
different persuasion to meet and as a factor contributing to mixed marriages. The structure
of a city's school system also forms a similar condition. This hypothesis puts forward that
cities with separate schools for Catholics, Jews, Protestants, and pupils without a
denomination, intermarriage will be less frequent than in cities with mixed schools only.
In Britain, it has been held that comprehensive schooling fosters friendships between
children from different social classes (Ford 1968). The almost universal nature of public
schooling at the primary and secondary level in the tJnited States supposedly heated the
melting pot (Kennedy 1944). It; after emancipation, education remains de,~acto
segregated, then, according to our educutional-segre~ation hypothesis, Jewish-Gentile
intermarriage does not increase.
Up to now, we have only considered the opportunities for persons with different
denominations to marry each other. In a more elaborate theory on intermarriage, the
strength of their desires or dislikes should be included (Hendrickx, Lammers, and Ultee
1991). By doing so, we adapt Katz' idea on the conditionality of the effects of legislation
stipulating equal economic treatment of Jews for the occupations practiced by Jewish
persons: "Legal permission may theoretically create new economic opportunities, but these
must be both economically and socially attractive ifmotivation is to be initiated that will
encourage [their] exploitation ( Katz 1973, p. 182). ~ 5" Thus, the hypotheses that follow
specify the extent to which dc~ jure changes have de, facto effects.
Jewish tastes
Our most general hypothesis on Jewish motivation proposes that the stronger the
inclination for a city's Jews to marry Gentiles, the higher the likelihood of Jewish-Gentile
's This idea of Katz' adapts a notion of Weber's (1920). Weber held that an account of capitalism's
rise is incotnplete if it only involves the laws of free enterprise and free labor; the motivation of
persons to use these freedoms is also important. Weber argues that this motivation in the 17`h
century was strongest among various Protestant sects.
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intermarriage. "1"his hypothesis only becomes interesting and testable when it is conjoined
with more specitic assumptions. Weber (1920, III, pp. 355 and 366) showed that parts of
the Tenuch from the period before the exile in Babylon disapprove of outmarriage less
strongly than later texts. The Halachaalso disapproves of mixed marriages. Within early
20`~ century European Judaism, at least two currents existed: a liberal and an orthodox
tendency. In addition, apart from the Jews attending synagogues led by rabbis and prayer
houses with their rebbes, there was indifferent Jewry. Assuming that orthodox opposition
to intermarriage is stronger than liberal resistance and that indifferent Jewry was
unconcerned about it, we derive our orthodoxy hypothesis: the stronger the orthodox
tendency among the Jews of a city, the smaller the chances of Jewish-Gentile marriage.
Another hypothesis on Jewish desires and dislikes involves the contrast between endorsing
and disfavoring Zionism. With the pogroms in Russia since 1881, the messianic utopia in
Judaïsm became revitalized. In several parts of Europe, this led to a movement directed at
the nearby return of the Jewish people to a Judenstaat in Palestine. Thus, the more
Zionism has spread among the Jewish population of a city, the less prevalent marriages
will be between Gentiles and Jews.1ó We call this prediction our Zionism hypothesis.
Gentile dislikes
We have three hypotheses on Gentile likes and dislikes. The first assumes that a vote in
favor of anti-Semitic parties indicates a dislike ofJews. It says that the more votes that
anti-Semitic parties obtain in free elections within a city, the smaller the chances of
Jewish-Gentile marriage. Paraphrasing our anti-Semitism hypothesis, in cities with a rising
anti-Semitic vote the legal exclusion of Jews is foreshadowed in earlier lower chances of
Jewish-Gentile marriage.
16 The link between Zionism and infrequent intermarriage may be tenuous. International Zionism
never argued against intermarriage, although the Dutch Zionist Organization did so (Giebels 1975,
p.177). The orthodox association of Frankfurt excluded from membership these Jews who were
not ritually married ( Heuberger and Krohn 1988, p.76).
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Another hypothcsis concerns the Protestant and Roman Catholic disapproval of Jews.
Since Christianity provides grounds for anti-Semitism, in all our cities the likelihood of
Jews and non-believers marrying each other will be higher than that of Catholics and
Protestants marrying Jews. Inasmuch as Catholicism has a more elaborate belief system
and more routines to police trespassers, the chances for Catholics and Jews to intermarry
will be fewer than those for Protestants and Jews. Our denominutionul differences
hypothesis does not deny that Luther wrote against Jews. It assumes that Catholicism
practiced and justified the persecution of Jews more often than did Protestantism (Healey
1977). It does not treat all Christians alike (Lurie 1940) and details the view that
Christianity was at the root of the plight of European Jewry.
Our last hypothesis on Gentile tastes and distastes pertains to the proportion of a city's
population that is Catholic or Protestant. This size hypothesi.c says that in cities where
Catholics (or Protestants) form a small minority, the desire of these believers to maintain
their group will be strong, leading to fewer chances for intermarriage between Jews and
Protestants (or Catholics). It was formulated by Karády for Protestant-Jewish
intermarriage in Hungary (1987).
Plus
Our final hypothesis contrasts Jewish-Gentile interman iage with Catholic-Protestant
intermarriage. As a stepping stone, we state a proposition on the trend in Catholic-
Protestant intermarriage. As far as we could determine, in all of this paper's cities during
the 19`h century man iages between Catholics and Protestants were legally possible.
Analogous with our third hypothesis on laws and their year of introduction, we predict a
gradual increase in Catholic-Protestant intermarriage during the first part of the 20`~
century. However, given the decrees of the Catholic hierarchy against outmarriage and
similar rulings by Protestant synods, mating will not be random. Assuming that Catholic-
Protestant intermarriage became legally allowed before Jewish-Gentile intermarriage, at
any point in time the chances of Catholic-Protestant intermarriage are higher than those of
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.Iwish-Catholic and .lewish-Protestant intermarriage. We will call this our hypothesis
comparing all religions.
What not
As indicated, our hypotheses must be seen as complementing each other. Although our
tirst one taken on its own says that the longer ago Jewish legal emancipation occurred
within a city, the more likely Jewish-Gentile marriages will be, this hypothesis assumes
that the other factors of our theory do not change. For that reason, our theory does not
predict a trend towards more mixed marriages; if residential segregation rises, the vote for
anti-Semitic parties increases and Zionism spreads within a city, a trend towards less
intennarriage might be found. In fact, our theory does not say anything on how these
factors develop with the passage of time. It may be that technological change makes for
less educational and residential segregation of Jews and Gentiles, or perhaps the opposite
is true. Thus our theory remains silent on Goldscheider and Zuckerman's (1984, pp. 7-9
and pp. 80-81) questíon of the erosion or creation of conditions for Jewish solidarity by
modern conditions. ~ ~
Our theory bypasses several current hypotheses. ~~ One of them postulates an after-effect of
the varying strength of Gentile opposition to Jewish legal emancipation, another long-term
~' Goldscheider and Zuckerman (1984, pp.84 and 92) misstate some of their findings when they
favor the hypothesis of Jewish persistence. They speak of strong evidence for residential
segregation, but do not make proper comparisons between cities and points in time. It will not do
to downplay an increase in percent outmarriage by saying that, even in the 1930s, most Jews in
Western and Central Europe married Jews.
'~ Apart from those to be listed, we think ofthe hypotheses (1) that the more the occupational
distributions of a city's Jews and Gentiles resemble each other, the higher the chances of Jewish-
Gentile marriage (Karády 1985): (2) that if Jewish persons speak Yiddish at home, they are less
likely marry a Gentile; and (3) that the longer ago a Jewish person's family has migrated to the
city, the more likely this person is to marry a Gentile. These statements cannot be tested with the
available data.
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etfèct of the intensity with which .lews strove for emancipation. We do not think that the
Jewish populations of our six cities dittèred that much in their support for equal rights.
Purnass~im would have been displeased to lose their power to discipline, tax, and dispense
welfare. However, general Jewish animosity would have soon dissipated, since the rights
to settle anywhere and take up any occupation are advantageous. Our hypothesis on the
vote for anti-Semitic parties captures Gentile opposition to Jewish emancipation.
Michman (1989) asserts that the division of Dutch society into denominational pillars,
makes for a relatively low Jewish-Gentile intermarriage rate in Amsterdam. We made this
idea less abstract by postulating that cities differ in the prevalence of religiously segregated
schools. Political parties with ties to denominations existed everywhere. Their effects, we
hold, are mediated by the existence of religious schools.
A last and up to now unstated hypothesis, holds that cities where Jews form a smaller
proportion of the population show a higher percentage of Jews married to Gentiles. We
think this statement somewhat tautological: if the percentage of Jews is high, then that
many Jews just cannot marry outside their group. This has been seen for a long time and
has led to methods that discount the logical effects of group size. An older method
compares actual trequencies of Jewish-Gentile intermarriage with frequencies expected on
the assumption of randoan mating.19 However, this method has been criticized as failing its
goal. Methods that attain their purpose involve computation of (log) odds ratios (Hout
1983). We remove the logical effects of group size on the percentage of intermarriage by
applying such a method. The variable to be explained will be the odds of Jewish men
marrying Jewish rather than Gentile women, compared to the odds of Gentile men
manying Jewish rather than Gentile women.
'`' Tachauer (1913) urged this method, whereas Ruppin (1934), Goldscheider and Zuckerman
(1984) and Michman (1989) spurned it, and fell back on simple percentages.
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DATA
In this paper, we test our hypotheses on time series for six major European cities with a
sizable proportion of Jewish inhabitants. We chose cities rather than countries on two
grounds. To begin with, measures for intermarriage should refer to an actual "marriage
market." For persons seeking spouses, their city forms the pool of eligibles. In addition,
the concentration of Jews in particular parts of a country makes data for a whole country
less desirable. We chose major cities rather than smaller municipalities because Jews, in
the countries and decades for which data are available, tended to live in big cities. We
sought data for major cities with a sizable proportion of Jewish inhabitants; if they had few
Jews, the statistics would be unreliable. We tried to obtain time series for as many cities as
possible satisfying our requirements, but given the varying detail of their population
registers, we settled for data from Amsterdam, Berlin, Budapest, Riga, and Vienna. We
would have liked to include similar series for Bucharest, London, Paris, and Prague, but
we did not find them.2" We limited our time series to the four decades before World War
II, since data for a longer period were not available for most of our cities. We
supplemented the Berlin numbers with data for Frankfurt-on-the-Main because the latter
German city in the period we studied had a higher proportion of Jewish inhabitants than
Berlin and because it was a large city.
-- Table 3 about here --
Intermarriage statistics
Table 3 presents tables for marriages agreed upon in our six cities in 1931, crossing the
denomination or religion of the husband against that of the wife. They were given the
same format by collapsing confessions into four groupings: Catholic, Protestant, Jewish,
Other (including no denomination). If population book-keeping is really reliable, data for
Berlin 1901 include as a Jewish-Jewish marriage the union of Georg Hermann Borchardt
'o Della Pergola (1972) is the richest collectíon ofdata on Jewish-Gentile intermarriage that we
know. It is not useful for our purposes since it omits for all cities (except Milan, ltaly), the number
of Gentiles marrying Gentiles. This collection also refers to data for Bucharest.
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and Martha Heynemann. This paper's Appendix lists sources of religious intermarriage
tables,~~ as well as sources for explanatory variables discussed later on.
For some cities, certain tables are missing. Riga has the highest number of missing years.
This series starts in 191 1, skips 1919, and ends in 1938. It often pertains to periods of five
years, but this is not as bad as it seems. The small number of Riga's inhabitants, might
make a yearly series unreliable. A city with a somewhat lower number of missing years is
Vienna. This city's tables are lacking for 1921-1926, 1930, 1933-1934, and the year of the
Anschluss (1938). The series for Vienna stops in 1941. The series for Berlin and Frankfurt
show no interruptions. The Berlin series commences in 1900, and that for Frankfurt in
1901. For both cities the series end earlier than we would have liked, but the effects of
Hitler's rise to power will show up in the series for Berlin which stops in 1938, and that for
Frankfurt which ends in 1935 (with 1938 added). The series for Budapest breaks between
1917-1919.
Data for Amsterdam cover the full period 191 1-1943. Data for 1900-1910 are guestimates.
For this period, data for the denomination of both spouses were not published in the
format of table 3. It is known how many Jews married Jews, Protestants Protestants, etc.,
thus the frequencies for the various types of religiously homogeneous marriages in table 3
are known. However, in the published statistics, the number of Jewish males marrying
Protestant females has been added to the number of Protestant males marrying Jewish
females, etc. That is, two cell entries have been combined each time. To arrive at the
frequencies for the separate cells, we took the full tables for 1911-1939 as our starting
point. On the basis of the average of all 1911-1939 tables, we computed the ratio of the
number of Jewish men marrying Protestant women and the number of Protestant men
'~ S. XVII-XVIIf of the 16th volume of the Bc~itru~Te zur.StuJistik der StudJ FrunkfurJu.M. says:
"Hierbei ist die verh~ltnismassig hohe Zahl von 81 (Mischehen bei denen entweder der Mann
oder die Frau der Konfession nach Juden waren) im Jahre 1933 bemerkenswert. Sie h~ngt
offenbar zusammen mit Ehen, die in Erwartung rassenpolitischer Gesetze vorweg genommen
worden sind. Erfreulich ist dann das starke Abfallen der Zahlen in den Folgenden Jahren auch
schon vor den Nurnberger Gesetzen."
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marrying Jewish women, etc.. "('his ratio t~r the period 191 1-1939 was applied to the
available numbers for each year of the period 1900-1910. As a check, we applied our
ratios to each avaílable table for the period 1911-1939 and compared the trend in the
actual 191 1-1939 data with the trend in the estimated 191 1-1939 data. These trends were
virtually identical. This bestowed some credence upon our 1900-1910 numbers.
Table 3 indicates the denomination of persons at the time they married. This raises a
question on what it tells about integration. lt is clear that if, before marrying, persons
changed their faith to correspond with that of their future spouse, this does not show up in
the number of intermarriages. The same goes for those who adopted their partner's creed
after they married. People convert to gain approval for their union, to avoid conflict when
raising children, or for some other reason. When it is accepted that adhering to a certain
religion is not necessarily a life-long trait and that religious freedom implies the right to
convert, it is not worrisome that the frequencies for in- and outmarriage analyzed in this
paper pertain to the time these marriages were agreed upon. On this account, it is possible
that if an increase in intermarriage were to be found, intermarriage for a city has
augmented only because inhabitants once converting before marriage no longer do so.
However, we know of no theory that yields such a detailed prediction. Indeed, if people no
longer convert before marrying, this change in itself indicates more integration.22
Whether the Viennese figures on religious intermarriage are useful for comparative
research, is more difficult to answer. Given marriage laws embodying the principle of
obligatory church marriage rather than obligatory civil marriage, could statistics for
Vienna be likened to those for this paper's other cities? After all, if marriages between
Christians and Gentiles are not allowed and people in Vienna not only convert for social
but also for legal reasons, then the numbers for Vienna are off the mark to some extent.
Given the legal possibility of a Nntzivilehe, unions between Jews and persons without a
"That is, mixed marriages do not indicate assimilation, but conversions do - irrespective of
whether conversions occur in order to surmount legal barríers to mixed marriages or for other
reasons. Honigmann ( 1989) shows that intermarriage figures are more stable than conversion
statistics.
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faith arc probably marriages between Christians and Jews, and if people convert to the
faith of their spouse in order to surmount legal barriers, the numbers for Gentile-Gentile
and Jewish-Jewish marriages are too high.
However, the assertion that marriages in Austria between Christians and Jews were
forbidden by law, should not be taken at face value. This is obvious from the pertinent
numbers for 1931 Vienna in table 3: in cells where zero entries are expected, sizable
frequencies are found. [ndeed, this is the case in every table from 1915 onwards. As has
been stated, Austria's law allowed for a Notzivilehe. Apparently, since that year, when a
Christian and a Jew applied to be married under that paragraph, permission was more
easily granted than before. In fact, Ruppin (1934, p. 317) states: "In Austria a mixed
marriage can only take place in a roundabout way: either the Christian party to it has to
leave the Church, or an official permit must be obtained, which, as a rule, is not difficult."
Ruppin does not say why it became easy to circumvent the law. However, commentaries
on the Austrian Civil Law from the interbellum (Pisko 1934) make it clear that although
Paragraph 64 stipulates that marriages between Christians and non-Christians cannot be
concluded, this impediment to marriage is dispensable, and that according to Paragraph 83
municipal authorities decide on dispensations without interference from the judiciary. It is
our conjecture that when the Social Democrats gained political power in Vienna at the
start of World War I, dispensations for Jewish-Gentile intermarriage were given. We hold
that the Vienna data for 1915 and later are comparable to those for this paper's other cities
and may be used to ascertain integration.23 To some extent, the numbers for Vienna in the
period 1900-1914 understate Jewish-Gentile integration.
" That is, since 1915, in Vienna a Jewish-Gentile marriage without conversion was a real option.
lf couples kept following old ways around legal barriers, this does indicate a propensity to
assimilate, but not a tendency to integrate. Honigmann (1989) criticized the argument that,
because of higher chances of leaving their confession, Viennese Jewry assimilated faster than
Berlin and Budapest Jewry. While agreeing that Viennese conversion figures are inflated because
of marriage law, we hold that conversion indicates assimilation rather than integration. [n this, we
follow Ruppin (1934, p.334): in places and times where Jews are held in low esteem, their
propensity toward conversion is strong and toward Jewish-Gentile marriages weak; when and
25
Residential segregation
Data on Jewish-Gentile residential segregation in Amsterdam (cf. Engelsdorp Gastelaars,
Vijgen, and Wagenaar 1985) pertain to 1906, 1920, 1930, and 1941. They divide this city
into some 50 quarters. The numbers for Berlin (cf Lowenstein 1983) refer to 1910, 1925,
1933, and 1939, and involve 20 districts. Data for Budapest refer to 10 districts and the
years 1900. 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1941. Frankfurt's numbers pertain to 14 districts in
1895, 1910, and 1925 (cf. Gley 1936). Figures for Riga involve 12 districts in 1913, 1920,
1925, and 1930 and 39 quarters in 1935. Data for Vienna (cf. Rosenblit 1983) cover 21
districts in 1900, 1910, 1923, 1934, and 1939.
We summarized our residential segregation data with dissimilarity indices.Z`~ The higher
this index, the more residential segregation; the lower, the more mixed housing. It is not
prudent to compare dissimilarity indices for cities differing strongly in the number of
districts (and the average percentage of a city's population living in a certain district). For
that reason, we regrouped Amsterdam's 50 quarters into 11 districts.25 When the districts
of a city became subdivided over the course of time (this happened in Budapest and Riga),
we merged the new into the old ones; if a city's area increased ( Frankfurt and Vienna), we
deleted new districts. We corrected the 1906 Amsterdam figures by including the territory
annexed in 1920.
where Jewish persons meet on equal terms, the inclination of Jews toward mixed marriages, but
not toward conversion, is pronounced.
~a We follow the Pcc~ Duncanu (Massay and Denton 1988). The objections against dissimilarity
indices are by now familiar, but no alternative is available for cases in whicli the number of
districts vary from one city to another and a certain district in one city cannot be equated with a
district in another city (Charles and Grusky 1995).
~' Our procedure for collapsing did not make much of a difference. A schema for collapsing
Amsterdam's quarters into 21 districts used by Amsterdam's Bureau of Statistics in 1920, yielded
for that vear's Jewish-Gentile residential segregation a dissimilarity index of 53, as did our
schcma.
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The district in Amsterdam with the highest percentage of Jews (35) was the Jodenhoek,
and its quarters Jodenbreestraat, Uilenburgerstraat, and Waterlooplein were 900~o Jewish.
In Riga, the highest percentage (40) of Jews was found in the Maskavas, in Vienna in
Leopoldstadt (300~0), in Frankfurt in and around the old ghetto (~stliche Nordstadt, 200~0),
in Berlin in the Mitte (including Alexanderplatz and Scheunenviertel) and in Wilmersdorr
(each l00~0), and in Budapest in Józsefváros (200~0).
Dissimilarity indices for all cities and all years are given in table 4. All in all residential
segregation was greatest in Amsterdam and least in Budapest. We rank cities after the
extent Jews and Gentiles inhabit different districts in column 3 of table 5. To facilitate a
test of our hypotheses against each other, columns 1 and 2 of table 5 restate data on Jewish
emancipation and marriage laws from table 2. In the following, we add more columns to
table 5.
-- Tables 4, 5, and 6 about here --
According to table 4, the dissimilarity index for Amsterdam decreased. We regard the rise
ín 1941 as an effect of the inflow of some 10,000 Jewish fugitives from Germany into
newly-built suburbs. Berlin's index rose steadily;2~ Budapest's at first dropped, to stabilize
in the 1920s, and to rise in 1941. We cannot ascertain a trend for Frankfurt since data for
1933 and 1939 are lacking, but a rather strong overall increase in the dissimilarity index
seems likely. Riga's index increased somewhat.27 Its tigure for 1920 is an unimportant
~~ lt is unlikely that the relocation order issued to Jews living in Berlin's wealthier quarters at the
end of 1938, fully accounts for the rise in residential segregation between 1933 and 1939.
'' The index for Riga in 1935 is an estimate. In one respect, we could not bring Riga's 39 quarters
for 1935 back to its earlier 12 districts. In effect the border between two districts had been
redrawn in sucli a way that a part of a district witli few Jews had been added to a district with a lot
of Jews. By merging these two districts for all the years for which data were available and
comparing the dissimilarity indices tlius obtained with the original ones, we estimated that Riga's
index for 1935 was not 49 as computed with not fully comparable districts, but 53.
27
exception. As a consequence of evacuations during World War I, Riga's population in
1920 was half of that in 1913. In Vienna, there was virtual stability until 1934 and a rise in
segregation afterwards.
The increases or decreases in a city's residential segregation are compared in column 2 of
table 6. Amsterdam shows the strongest decrease in separate living, Budapest the one but
strongest. We decided to regard Frankfurt as the city where residential segregation
increased most, with Berlin having the one but strongest increase. Column 1 of table 6
indicates whether the right to conclude a Jewish-Gentile manriage was introduced before
1900 or after it. The latter initial condition will be used to test a dynamic derivation from
our marriage-laws hypothesis. This prediction says that in cities where people recently
obtained the right to a religiously mixed marriage, the increase in Jewish-Gentile marriage
ïn the period 1900-1940 is stronger than in a city where that right has been established for
decades.
Educational segregation
Initial information on the segregation of pupils after their religion was taken from
reference works. In Austria, Germany, and Hungary in the period studied here, most
schools were religiously mixed. Catholics, Jews, and Protestants went to the same primary
and secondary schools and there were special teachers for instructing pupils belonging to a
certain denomination in that confession's lore. The Dutch and Latvian situation was
different. In the Netherlands, until 1918, the state paid part of the costs for schools run by
various denominations for their own flock, and after 1918 the full costs. In independent
Latvia, the state paid for the schools of minorities such as Jews.
This evidence was checked against and somewhat expanded by school statistics (cf.
Ruppin 1934, pp. 298-310, the Appendix to this paper gives the main statistical sources).
In Berlin around 1900, there were no Jewish primary schools, one middle school for
Jewish boys and one for Jewish girls. Later on an orthodox Jewish primary school was
founded. We estimate their pupils for both periods as making up at most 15 0~0 of all
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Jewish pupils in secondary education. "I~he Philanthropin was a Jewish primary and middle
school in Frankfurt, and before World War I it had some 600 pupils. There also was an
orthodox primary and middle school with some 900 pupils (Arnsberg 1983, pp. 889-890).
We estimate that about 30 0~0 of Jewish pupils went to Jewish schools. In Vienna at the end
ofthe 1920s, there were some 400 municipal primary schools; in addition there were 26
Roman-Catholic, 6 Protestant, and 2 Jewish private primary schools. Of the Jewish pupils,
around 5 0~o went to a primary school of their own faith, of the Protestant pupils around 20
o~o and of the Catholic pupils about 10 0~0. No Jewish secondary schools existed in Vienna.
In Budapest in the early 1920s and at the end of the 1930s, of all Catholic primary school
pupils some 5 0~o went to a confessional-supposedly Catholic-school; of the Jewish pupils
some 20 0~o went to a denominational-we assume Jewish-school. However, about half of
all Jewish schools were founded after 1920, so for the period before 1920, the percentage
of Jewish pupils visiting Jewish schools should perhaps be put at about 10.
After Latvian independence, a school system arose with separate schools for Jewish
pupils, financed by the state. This system was stipulated by clauses on minority rights in
the Versailles Peace Treaty, to be supervised by the League ofNations. In the whole of
Latvia, at the end of the 1920s some 85 0~0 of all Jewish primary school pupils went to
Jewish schools. The language of instruction in somewhat less than halfofall Jewish
schools was Yiddish, one third Hebrew, one sixth German, and one twelfth Russian
(Mendelsohn l 983, pp. 250-251). Although we lack details for the period that Latvia was
part of Russia, we assume that Jews attended separate primary schools.
In Amsterdam in 1900, there were two Jewish primary schools and no Jewish secondary
schools; in 1930 there were four Jewish primary schools and two Jewish secondary
schools. We estimate that decidedly less than 10 0~0 of all Jewish pupils attended Jewish
schools, and all others went to public schools. However, next to public schools that mixed
the denominations, there existed in Amsterdam separate primary and secondary schools
for Catholics and for Protestants. The percentage of primary school pupils attending these
so-called special schools varied over the course of time. In 1880, it was 50, in 1890, it
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dropped to 40, in 1900 to 30, in 1910 it remained at 30, and in 1920 it had fallen further to
25. Then, as a consequence of a new law that financed the full costs of special schools
from state funds, the percentage of pupils in special primary schools rose again. In 1930, it
was 40, and in 1940, it became 50. For this reason, the schools of Amsterdam were more
segregated than those in Berlin. Budapest, Frankfurt, and Vienna. However, the extent of
religious segregation decreased in Amsterdam during most of the period considered. Note,
that because of a difference of some ten years between leaving primary school and
marrying, most of the marriages studied in this paper will not show any of the presumed
effects of the law that so strongly pillarized Dutch society. In column 4 of table 5, we rank
the six cities of this paper after the extent to which their schools segregated or mixed
Jewish and Gentile pupils.
Orthodoxy
We found no study comparing the strength of orthodoxy within Judaism in various
European cities or states in the first decades ofthe 20`h century. Breuer (1986, p. 6) has
remarked that for Germany the percentage of Jewish persons that were orthodox or liberal,
is not available. However, Lowenstein (1976, p. 48) pointed to substitutes such as the
presence of a functioning mikvc~ in a Jewish congregation and the number of orthodox
rabbis in some regions as a percentage of all rabbis there. By focusing on the number of
synagogues and the number of synagogue seats, we take our lead from Lowenstein's idea.
It is safe to assume that, of the cities considered here, orthodox Judaism was strongest in
Riga. The influx of Husa~iclim from the Pale offset the effects of German liberalism.
According to Vestermanis (1995, p. 25), there were in Riga in 1907, for some 25,000
,fews, six large synagogues and six prayer houses. In the 1930s, there were seven
synagogues and 27 minyanim for 40,000 Jews.
Berlin Judaism was once the most liberal of Europe. Frankfurt Jewry was at one time
commonly regarded as more orthodox than Berlin Jewry. ~rhe latter is con-oborated by
other indicators: of the fourteen synagogues belonging before 1933 to Berlin's Jewish
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community, four were orthodox; for 170,000 Jews there were 21,000 seats, some 20 0~0 of
these seats was in orthodox synagogues (Bendt, Galliner, Jersch-Wenzel, and Jersch 1987,
pp. 94-152). In Frankfurt, two of the four communal synagogues were orthodox. These
four synagogues held 4,000 seats for 28,000 Jews (Heuberger and Krohn 1988, p. 160).
Half the seats in Frankfurt's communal synagogues were in orthodox ones.
In Berlin and Frankfurt, debates on rites fostered the formation of orthodox associational
synagogues and private prayer houses as alternatives to communal synagogues. In
Amsterdam, there were no separate orthodox and liberal synagogues. In 1900 (1938) the
nine (seven) synagogues of Amsterdam totaled 4,800 (4,500) seats for 60,000 (70,000)
Jews (Meijer 1969, p. 42). For Amsterdam, the number of Jews per communal synagogue
seat was about 14, for Berlin 8, and for Frankfurt 7. We therefore ranked Amsterdam as
less orthodox than Berlin. Although perhaps Berlin Jewry was the most liberal of Europe,
Amsterdam Jewry, with its large proletariat, had become most distanced from orthodox
Judaism. Note that the omission of associational synagogues and private prayer houses in
our exercise barely affects our conclusion about Amsterdam Jewry compared with Berlin
and Frankfurt Jewry. If the number of seats in Berlin and Frankfurt was higher than
assumed, since Amsterdam had few non-communal places (Van Agt 1974), the
differences between Amsterdam and these two cities become even larger.
In Vienna at the end of World War I, six ofthe seven communal synagogues were liberal.
All the communal ones together held 5,000 seats (for 200,000 persons), or 40 persons per
seat. Thus Vienna would appear less orthodox than Amsterdam. However, Vienna counted
sixteen associational synagogues, three of them orthodox. It also had 81 private prayer
houses, almost always orthodox. Associational synagogues were decidedly larger than
private prayer houses. All in all, there were 10,000 liberal seats and a more or less equal
number of orthodox places for the approximately 200,000 Jewish inhabitants of Vienna, or
one seat per 10 Jewish persons. In 1936, there were 10,000 liberal and 19,000 orthodox
places for 175,000 Jews, or one seat per six Jewish persons (Freidenreich 1991, pp. 119-
120). These figures say that Vienna's Jews were more orthodox than Amsterdam's Jews.
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Since a lot of Jews left Galicia during World War I, it is not surprising that in Vienna the
proportion oforthodox Jews increased.
As already indicated, places in associational synagogues and private prayer houses were
not included in the Berlin and Frankfurt frequencies. Therefore, to bring Vienna fully into
our grading, our figures on the number of Jews per seat in Berlin and Frankfurt must be
revised. Before the Kristallnachl, Berlin had somewhat less than 100 associational
synagogues and private prayer houses (Bendt, Galliner, Jersch-Wenzel, and Jersch 1987,
p. 92). F'rankfurt had some forty private prayer houses and one (orthodox) associational
synagogue, the latter holding 2,000 seats for an association comprising 15 0~0 of all
Frankfurt Jews (Heuberger and Krohn 1988, pp. 166-167). For Frankfurt, dividing its
number of Jews by the number of seats in the four communal synagogues plus one
associational synagogue, we arrive at a figure of 4. Assuming on average 100 places in the
100 non-communal synagogues in Berlin, we obtain a figure of 5. This leads us to regard
the Jews of Vienna, with a figure of 6 or more Jews per seat, as less orthodox than the
Jews of Berlin and Frankfurt.
Freidenreich (1991, pp. 1 17 and 121) estimated that a small 20 oro of Viennese Jews were
orthodox. The election returns for the Viennese Ku1lusKemeinde fonned the basis for this
guess. This percentage may be compared with that of about 30 for Frankfurt. After all, if
there are 2,000 seats in an associational orthodox synagogue for 15 0~0 of all Frankfurt
Jews plus 2,000 seats in two communal orthodox synagogues, a total of 30 0~o cannot be
far off the mark.
In 1869, the rabbis and laymen at the Jewish Congress of Hungary split into two groups of
equal size. There were a few persons who did not want to choose between orthodoxy and
what was tenned neology; they were called the status quo. In 1920, almost 90 0~0 of
Budapest's Jews were neolog, and ] 0 0~0 orthodox (László 1969, p. 142 and pp. 150-151).
This makes Budapest Jewry less orthodox than Viennese Jewry. Our resolution to this
effect is more or less confinned by other figures: in 1925 Budapest, with the same number
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of Jews as Vienna, officially had 14 synagogues and 25 prayer houses. Gruber (1994,
p. 152) gives a total of 125 synagogues and prayer rooms for Budapest.
This leaves us to grade Amsterdam and Budapest Jewry after orthodoxy. If there were
seven official synagogues and a couple ofprivate prayer houses for 70,000 Jews in
Amsterdam, and a total of 125 official and private places of worship for 215,000 Jews in
Budapest, then Amsterdam may be regarded as less orthodox than Budapest. In column 5
oftable 5, our six cities are ranked after the degree of orthodoxy of their Jewish
inhabitants.
Zionism
To gauge Zionist support among Jews in Amsterdam, Berlin, Budapest, Frankfurt, Riga,
and Vienna, we gathered for Austria, Germany, Hungary, and the Netherlands, the number
ofshekel payers to the World Zionist Organization in the early 1920s.28 Austria in 1922
(1924) had 28,230 (5,468) payers, Germany 18,145 (20,847), Hungary 600 (1,513), Latvia
11,608 (9,053), and the Netherlands 3,197 (1,784). Having scrutinized the numbers, we
consider that the Hungarian ones deserve comment. Under the Friedrich Decree from
1921, the bylaws of any organization had to be approved by the authorities. After pressure
from the World Zionist Organization, the Hungarian Zionist Organization gained this
consent in 1927, but pending permission activity was at an ebb. In 1932 (1934) there were
1,750 (1,757) Hungarian shekel payers.
After collecting and checking these data, we divided the number of shekel payers in a
country by its number of Jewish inhabitants. Latvia proved to be the state where Zionism
'g We did not chose figures from years before the First World War because Latvia at that time was
part of Russia, which would make for missing data. We chose figures for the early 1920s because
those for some countries in later years were quite fraudulent. For the same reason, we choose
figures for off-Zionist Congress years. Michman (1989, p.13), when searching for indications of
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was strongest, Hungary that where it was weakest. Dutch Zionism was weaker than
German Zionism, and the latter weaker than Austrian Zionism.2y We assumed the ranking
ofour cities aíter their support for Zionism to be the same as that of the countries of which
they are a part, and surmised Zionist support in Frankfurt to be stronger than in Berlin and
weaker than in Vienna. Column 6 oftable 5 contains this ranking.
Anti-Semitism
Jewish emancipation in Austria, Hungary, and Germany in the 1860s, caused a reaction
(Katz 1980). Of our cities, the politics of Vienna before World War I was the most anti-
Semitic. Although the Austrian emperor twice refused to appoint Lueger-who
opportunistically opposed Jewry-as mayor of Vienna, he consented in 1897. Lueger stayed
in power until his death in 1910.
During the first decade after World War I, anti-Semitism was strongest in Hungarian
politics. Jews were held responsible for the Red Terror of 1919, and shortly after the
White Terror. Jews were punished by a numerus cluusus for the universities. In the 1926
elections for the National Council, the party most in favor of this law got 18 0~0 of the
Budapest vote. This percentage was 21 in 1931 and 26 in 1935. The successor to this pariy
in the 1939 elections was the Party of Hungarian Life, and it gained 33 0~0 of the vote in
support for Zionism, while repeating the usual criticism of the number of shekel payers, stops
short of regarding the numbers of early 1920s shekel-payers as useful.
~~' Our ranking of countries after the number of shekel payers in the first years after the first World
War accords fairly well with the contribution to the Jewish National Fund per Jewish inhabitant of
a country in 1910 and the first part of 191 I(and in the second part of 191 I, 1912, and the first part
of 1913): Austria 10.5 ( I 8.9) German Pfennig, Germany 13.8 (33.2), Hungary I.6 (1.8), and the
Netherlands 8.4 (18.6) Pfennig.
34
Budapest. The more anti-Semitic Arrow Cross Party, which was forbidden to take part in
the 1935 elections, polled 25 0~0 of the Budapest vote in 1939.;~'
Given the singularity of the Kristcr!lnucht, which bypassed neither Berlin nor Frankfurt,
political anti-Semitism in the 1930s was strongest in Germany. In 1923, the leader ofthe
National-Socialist Party attempted a putsch and failed. In the 1926 elections for the
Reichstcr~~, this party obtained ihree percent of the vote, 180~o in the 1930 elections, about
380~o in those of .luly 1932, and some 320~o in November 1932. The vote for the Swastika
was stmnger in Frankfurt than in Berlin. The 'crooked cross' in July 1932 took 29 0~0 of
the Berlin vote and 39 o~o of the vote in Frankfurt (Pulzer 1992, pp. 300 and 314).
]n Austria during several Reich.ti~r-ut elections held in the 1920s, various pro-German
parties gained some 15 0~0 of the vote. [n Vienna in the 1930 Re~ichsrut election, the sister
party of the German National-Socialists obtained 10 0~0 of the vote, and in the Landsrat
elections of 1932 about 17 a~o. This party, which campaigned against Jews and an existing
international treaty forbidding Austria to join Germany, became outlawed in 1933. A
putsch by some of its members failed in 1934, but Chancellor pollfuss was killed in it.
"I'he early emancipation of Dutch Jewry provoked no political reaction. In the 1935
provincial elections in the Netherlands, a National-Socialist party gained eight percent of
the nation-wide and 11 0~0 of the Amsterdam vote. It was the first time such a party had
won seats. The elections for national parliament in 1937 gave this party four percent. In
these elections, six percent of the vote in Amsterdam went to this party. In the 1939
provincial elections, it polled six percent of the vote in Amsterdam, and in the 1939
municipal elections in this city seven percent (De Jonge 1968, pp. 101, 127, and 153).
The 1922-1934 Latvian Parliament consisted of 100 deputies and some 20 parties.
Laserson (1971, pp. 163 and 185) states that Ulmanis, when committing the 1934 coup
'" As a consequence of the Second Jewish Law, about half of al I Budapest Jews lust the right to
vote because they could not prove that they or their parents had been living continuously in
Hungary since 1867 (Katzburg 1981, pp.158-159).
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d'état making him dictator, was Prime Minister and leader of the Farmers' Union. Its open
and black anti-Semitism had been indicated in Latvian Parliament in 1928 by the Jewish
representative Nurock. The German Bloc also had an anti-Semitic tendency (Laserson
1971, pp. 162 and 171). It may be supposed that the parties of the Right Wing were more
anti-Semitic than the Farmers' Union. We estimated the anti-Semitic vote in Riga on the
basis of the classification of party names in Bilmanis (1951, pp. 342-343) and the results
for Riga of the four interhellum elections for Parliament. We arrived at 20 0~o for the Right
Wing plus the Farmers' Union plus the German Bloc. In 1927, aputsch by the fascist
Thunder Cross failed (Laserson 1971, p. 143) and led to a ban on this movement.
Data on political anti-Semitism around 1930 are summarized in column 7 oftable 5.
Table 6, column 3 gives the ranking of our cities after the increase in the support for anti-
Semitism the period from 1900 to 1940.
Catholic and Protestant minorities
From table 3 it may be gauged that Protestants fonned a small minority in Budapest and
Vienna only. In fact, in the period considered in this paper, about 20 0~0 of Budapest's and
some five percent of the Viennese population were Protestant. Protestants were the
majority in Amsterdam, Berlin, Frankiurt and Riga. In Berlin and Riga Catholics formed
some ten percent of the population and constituted the majority in Budapest and Vienna.
JEWISH-GENTILE INTERMARRIAGE ASCERTAINED BY LOG ODDS
RATIOS
To measure the degree of intermarriage. we computed (log) odds ratios. For a 2~`2 table,
cross-classifying the denomination of husbands (,Iewish or Gentile) against that of their
wives (.Iewish or Gentile), the odds ratio is computed as the ratio of the odds of a Jewish
man marrying a Jewish woman (u) instead of a Gentile woman (b) and the odds of a
Gentile man marrying a Jewish woman (c) instead of a Gentile man (c~. The log odds ratio
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u~h
is then: log( . A lo~ odds ratio of zero indicates, as far as denomination goes,
c~cl
random matin~. We will present three-year averages of the log odds ratios. A lower ftgure
in a table or a downward sloping line in a graph indicates more intetmarriage, and a line
that goes up or a higher figure indicates less intermarriage.31
In order to test our hypotheses on Jewish-Gentile marriage as severely as possible, we
determined trends in log odds ratios for Jewish-Protestant, .Iewish-Catholic, and Jewish-
Other weddings separately rather than trends in one overall measure. Figure 1 gives trends
for .lewish-Protestant marriages, tigure 2 for .lewish-Catholic, and tigure 3 for Jewish-
Other man iages. We deal with intermarriages in this order to shrink statistical quirks. In
most cities, there are more Protestants than Catholics, and more Catholics than Others.
-- Figures 1, 2, and 3 about here --
The exclusion hypothesis
Our cxclusion htpothe.ti~i.~~ holds that Jewish-Gentile intermarriage did not decrease before
laws forbidding it were introduced in the 1930s or 1940s, nor before the legal position of
.lews began to deteriorate otherwise. Its incidence only decreased afterwards. Columns 3
and 4 of table 2 give the relevant initial conditions for applying this hypothesis. The
various years it stipulates, have been marked in table 7. This table ~ives the available log
`~ No answer is possible to the question of how low or high the lug odds ratio must be to say that
there is little or niuch intermarriage. This yuestion postulates unspecified points of reference.
However, it may be useful to compare Jewish-Gentile interrnarriage in the interbellum in Europe
with black-white intermarriage in the contemporary United States. From Kalmijn (1993, p.131,
table ?). it is possible to compute log odds ratios for 33 states reporting marriage license data to
the National Center for Health Statistics in 1970-1974 and 1983-1986. Thcse log odds ratios are
I I and 9 respectively. According to figures in Della Pergola (1972, p.40), the log odds ratio for
Jewish-Gentile intermarriage in Milan for 1934-1936 is 6. For 1937-1940 it is 7, and for 1940-
1945 it amounts to 8.
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odds ratios for each of our six cities for each year in the period 1930-1943. These figures
are not three-year averages, but actual ones for one specific year.;2
-- Table 7 about here --
In table 7, we see for Amsterdam no decrease in Jewish-Protestant marriage before the
German occupation of the Netherlands, no decrease in 1940, and a strong decrease in
194L Early 1942, Jewish-Gentile weddings became forbidden in Amsterdam, and Jewish-
Protestant marriage decreased very strongly for 1942 and 1943. Jewish-Protestant
marrïage remained stable in Berlin in 1930-1933, but decreased drastically from 1934 on.
In Frankfurt Jewish-Protestant marriage remained stable in 1930-1933, to fall sharply in
1934 and later years. Thus, interniarriage decreased before the introduction of the
Nuremberg laws in 1935, but not before Hitler became Chancellor in 1933. The level of
Jewish-Protestant marriage in Budapest was stable before the introduction of the First
Jewish Law of 1938, and decreased from 1938 on, with a very severe decrease after
.Iewish-Gentile marriages were forbidden in 1941. In Vienna, Jewish-Protestant marriage
began to decrease after the An.cchluss, not before it. Jewish-Protestant marriage in Riga
was stable.
Our hypothesis on actual Jewish-Gentile intermarriage shortly before and after the
introduction of laws forbidding them, may also be tested against the figures for Jewish-
Catholic intermarriage in table 7. In these instances, almost the same results are obtained.
We find one difference: the extent of Jewish-Catholic intermarriage began to diminish in
Amsterdam not in 1941, but in 1940. In addition, are the high figures for 1936 and 1939
statistical wobbles? The tígures for Jewish-Other intermarriage in table 7, do not
contradict these impressions, but strengthen them. All in alL the part of our exclusion
hypolhe.ci.c holding that Jewish-Gentile interniarriage did not decrease before the adoption
" It may be asked how it is possible that Jewish-Gentile intennarriage occurred after it became
forbidden (not all odds ratios for these years indicate complete closure). To begin with, the laws
applied a racial definition of Jews and Aryans, whereas our tables apply a denominational
definition. In addition, dispensations were granted (for instance in Budapest).
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ol~ laws tiirbidding it, must bc rcjcctcd. ~ I~hc part stating that it did not diminish before the
Icgal status of.lcws bcgan to dcclinc in othcr respccts, is uphcld-thc cxtcnt to which will
be discusscd latcr in this study.
The emancipation hypothesis and the intermarriage-laws hypothesis
We now move on to our hypotheses which proposes that Jewish emancipation in the 19`"
century occasioned a trend towards more Jewish-Gentile intermarriage, and predict a
ranking of cities on the extent to which .lewish-Gentile intermarriage agrees with their
ranking atter the year Jews were legally emancipated. When testing these hypotheses, we
disregard data for the years since thc legal status of Jews tírst worsened in the 20`" century.
Figure I shows that a trend towards more Jewish-Protestant intermarriage occurs in all of
our cities. During World War I, a temporary increase in Jewish-Protestant intermarriage
took place. In the period before this war, the trend towards more Jewish-Gentile
interniarriage in Amsterdam, Berlin, Budapest, and Frankfurt appears stronger than in the
period after it. The level of.lewish-Protestant marriage appears stable in Berlin in the
1920s. We add that it is not possible to represent in tigure 1 the fact that there is complete
closure (no Jewish-Pmtestant marriages at all) for Vienna in 1900-1914.
ln tigure l, the log odds ratio for Amsterdam decreased from 9 to 5 and that for Budapest
from 7 to 5. '1'his measure t~~r Berlin dropped from 7 to 6 and for Frankfurt from 8 to 7.
For Riga, it decreased trom 12 to 10, and for Vienna from complete closure to 8. The
ranking of our cities trom a strong to weak inclination to Jewish-Protestant interman-iage
is Budapest-Berlin-Frankfurt-Amsterdam-Vienna-Riga. This grading carries one
amendment: around 1930 more Jewish-Protestant intermarriage occurred in Amsterdam
than in Frankfurt. We cnter the ranking of our cities after the extent that Jews and
Protestants marry each other, as column 1 into table 8.
-- "l~able 8 about here --
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Figure 2, which depicts Jewish-Catholic intermarriage, again shows strong trends towards
more mixing. There are two exceptions: Jewish-Catholic intermarriage numbers appear
stable in Berlin and Frankfurt in the 1920s. The log odds ratio for Riga until some years
after World War I is not represented in this figure, because there was complete closure for
this period. The same goes for Vienna in 1900-1914. Amsterdam this time has a drop in
the log odds ratio from 9 to 7, Berlin from 8 to 7, Budapest from 7 to 5, Frankfurt from
somewhat above to a little below 8, Riga from complete closure to 11, and Vienna
witnesses a fall from complete closure to 8. All in all, figure 2 furnishes the same ranking
of cities as figure 1. From 1919 onwards, Amsterdam shows more Jewish-Catholic
intermatriage than Frankfurt, and, after 1931, more than Berlin. The grading of our cities
after the degree to which Catholics and Jews marry each other, is presented in column 2 of
table 8.
Figure 3 for Jewish-Other intermarriage is a bit blurry. This is not surprising given the low
percentage of Other persons in our cities. This percentage is lowest in Budapest; according
to table 4, it still was a bit above two in 1931. This time the log odds ratio for Riga until
some years after World War I is not represented. The line for Amsterdam presents a strong
trend towards more marriage between Jewish and Other persons (the log odds ratio
decreases from 9 to 6), that for Budapest a weaker one (this measure goes from 7 to 6). No
trend can be discerned for Berlin and Frankfurt (both log odds ratios around 6). In Riga,
Jewish-Other intermarriage increases (the log odds ratio drops from complete closure to
9). The line for Vienna indicates a trend towards less Jewish-Other intermarriage (the log
odds ratio rises from 3 to 6). The last finding is not surprising given Austrian law on
.Tewish-Gentile intermarriage at that time. On the whole, Riga has the lowest intermarriage
between Jews and Others, Amsterdam the lowest but one. Berlin, Budapest, and Frankfurt
are more or less on a par. Of these cities, before World War 1 the chances of marriage
between Jews and Others were lowest in Budapest and highest in Berlin. After World War
1, Budapest had the highest chances and Frankfurt the lowest. On the whole, Frankfurt had
less Jewish-Other intermarriage than Berlin. Immediately before 1933, Jewish-Other
intermarriage was more prevalent in Amsterdam than in Berlin and Frankfurt. We sort our
cities after their overall extent of Jewish-Other marriages in column 3 of table 8.
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Comparing columns I l0 3 of~tablc 8, the similarities are more striking than the
differences. There are two exceptions, and these involve Jewish-Other marriages. The high
incidence of this type of intermarriage in Vienna (compared with Catholic-Jewish and
.lewish-Protestant intermarriage) can be accounted for by the special nature of Austrian
marriage laws. We ascribe the relatively low incidence of Jewish-Other interman-iage in
Budapest to the very low percentage of Other persons there. All in all we hold that figures
1, 2, and 3 provide similar pictures. ,lewish-Gentile intermarriage was strongest in
Budapest, less strong in Berlin, and even less strong in Frankfurt. Jewish-Gentile
intermarriage in Amsterdam was wcaker than in Frankfurt, weaker still in Vienna, and
weakest in Riga. Jewish-Gentile intermaniage increased most in Amsterdam, in the early
1930s becoming more widespread than in Berlin and Frankfurt. We enter the rating of our
cities atter overall .lewish-Gentile intermarriage as column 8 into table 5. Table 6, column
4 compares our six cities atter their increase or decrease in Jewish-Gentile intermarriage.
To test the ranking ofcities predicted by our emuncipulion hypothe.ti~is, we compare
columns 1 and 8 in table 5. Bcrlin, Frankfurt, Riga, and Vienna are predicted conectly, but
Amsterdam and Budapest are three ranks off the mark. Thus, this hypothesis is not upheld.
Does our murricrgc~-lutit~.c hypc~~he~.ti~i.ti~ perform better? That hypothesis maintains that the
ranking of our cities on their extent of.lewish-Gentile intermarriage coincides with their
ranking on the year ,lewish-Gentile marriages became legally possible. A comparison of
columns 2 and 8 in table 5 provides a tcst. This time, only Riga and Vienna are predicted
correctly, Berlin and Frankfurt almost correctly, and Amsterdam and Budapest three
places otf the mark. That is, our marriage-laws hypothesis predicts worse than our
emancipation hypothesis.
"The anti-Semitism hypothesis
Which of our other hypotheses does account for the Amsterdam and Budapest anomalies?
In this respect, it will not do to invoke our unli-.Sc~mitism hypolhe.ti~is as providing the
capricious intervening factor. According to column 7 of table 5 Amsterdam had the lowest
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anti-Semitic vote and relatively little Jewish-Gentile intermarriage, whereas Budapest
cxperienced relatively strong anti-~emitism and a rclativcly strong propensity towards
Jewish-Gentile intermarriage. ln addition, ifanti-Semitism is that important, Riga is way
out off line. Our hypothesis on this Gentile dislike as an intervening factor fails.
The orthodoxy and the Zionism hypothesis
How do our hypotheses on Jewish preferences as intervening factors fare? Our orthodoxy
and 7.ionism hy~~othc~se.c do away with the exception of Budapest. After all, Budapest
Jewry was least supportive of 7.ionism and one but least orthodox. However, according to
columns 5 and 6 of table 5, Amsterdam remains an outlier on account of the ritual
indifference and weak "Zionism of its Jewish inhabitants. Amsterdam Jewry was the least
orthodox of all our cities, and the city one but least in favor of Zionism. Predictions made
with these hypotheses for our other cities, are less of the mark.
Segregation hypotheses
We hold that the best explanation of the according to our marriage-laws hypothesis
unexpectedly limited Jewish-Gentile intermarriage in Amsterdam and the on account of
this proposition surprisingly high Jewish-Gentile intermarriage in Budapest is provided by
our residentiul-.ti-egre~ulion hir~othesis. Of our six cities, Amsterdam has the highest
residential segregation and Budapest the lowest. The hypothesis that residential
segregation is the most important factor intervening between the introduction of laws
allowing for Jewish-Gentile marriages and the actual prevalence of these marriages, is
confirnied by other infornlation in table 5. Residential segregation was lowest but one in
Berlin, and highest but two in Vienna and highest but one in Riga. Of the rankings in
columns 3 to 7 in table 5, the ratings in column 3(for residential segregation) and
column 6(for Zionísm) accord most with the order in column 8 of this table.33 However,
the Zionism hypothesis does not account for Amsterdam as an exception to out
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intermarriage-laws hypothesis. Perhaps extensive Jewish-Gentile educational segregation
in Amsterdam contributed to Amsterdam's exceptionally low Jewish-Gentile
intermarriage, but educational segregation was weaker in Berlin and Vienna than in
Budapest.
Trends in intermarriage explained by residential segregation?
Column 4 oftable 6 ranks our six cities after the increase or decrease in Jewish-Gentile
marriage in the period from 1900 until the early 1930s. Which of our hypotheses accounts
for these changes? Does our residentiul-.ti~egrc~ution hynothesis in this case yield to best fit
between predictions and findings too?
We hold that the strong increase in Jewish-Gentile marriage in Riga and Vienna during the
first three decades of the 20`h century is to be explained by the recent introduction of laws
allowing for this type of marriage (compare column 1 of table 6). To explain the -
compared with Amsterdam and Budapest- weak and sometimes absent trend towards more
Jewish-Gentile marriage in Berlin and Frankfurt in these thirty years, our anti-Semitism
hypothesis might be invoked (column 3 of table 6). However, Berlin and Frankfurt are not
only the cities with the strongest growth in political anti-Semitism, they also are the towns
where residential segregation increased most (column 2 of table 6). In this case, two
hypotheses finish ex aequo.
To decide between the anti-Semitism and the residential-segregation hypothesis, we look
at the exact timing of changes. To begin with, political anti-Semitism.was to rise in Berlin
and Frankfurt in the second part of the 1920s only. This change cannot explain stability in
Jewish-Gentile man iage in these cities during the first part of the 1920s. Our residential
segregation hypothesis does so, since living in separate quarters increased in Berlin and
Frankfurt between 1910 and 1925 (table 4). In addition, in Amsterdam residential
segregation decreased in the 1920s (again table 4), with Jewish-Gentile marriage on the
" We do not think it wise to present Spearman correlations nor Pearson correlations.
43
rise there in this interval. Finally, anti-Semitism increased in Budapest in the early 1920s,
so if our anti-Semitism hypothesis is applicable to this city in this period, Jewish-Gentile
intermarriage should have decreased. However, it increased, whereas residential
segregation remained stable (once more table 4). These findings taken together make us
prefer the residential-segregation hypothesis above the anti-Semitism hypothesis.
Three additional hypotheses
This leaves us to test three more hypotheses. For these purposes we present figure 4,
depicting trends in Catholic-Protestant man iage by way ofthree-year moving averages.
We also regroup the lines in figures 1 to 4 into six graphs, each with four lines for one city
only. Those results are given in Figure 5.
-- Figures 4 and Sa-f about here --
Our denominational dif~erences hypothesis says that the propensity towards Jewish-
Catholic intermarriage is weaker than that towards Jewish-Protestant intermarriage, and
the chances of Jewish-Protestant intermarriage lower than those of Jewish-Other
intermarriage. We here assume that in our data, Other persons mostly are persons without
a denomination.
According to figure 5, of the three types of intermarriage just mentioned, Jewish-Catholic
marriage is least widespread in Amsterdam, Berlin, Frankfurt, and Riga; Jewish-Other
maniage is strongest in Amsterdam, Berlin, Frankfurt, Riga, and Vienna. This more or
less confirms our hypothesis. In Budapest, Jewish-0ther marriage is least, and Jewish-
Catholic marriage most prevalent; in Vienna Jewish-Protestant marriage occurs most
infrequently.
Our sizc~ hypolhc~.ris says that if Protestants fonn a small minority in a city, the extent of
Jewish-Protestant internlarriage will be smaller than in cities where Protestants constitute
the majority. This hypothesis might explain the, according to our denominational
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diftcrcnccs hypothcsis. cxccptionally low .Icwish-Protcstant intcrmarriagc in Vienna. In
addition, in Budapcst .Icwish-I'rotcstant marriage is less prevalent than Jcwish-Catholic
marriage.
Our size hypothesis also maintains that if Catholics (Protestants) constitute a small
minority, their tendency towards marrying Protestants (Catholics) will be smaller. We
found some evidence for this in our data. Table 3 shows that Catholics are a smaller
majority in Berlin than in Frankfurt. We have demonstrated that Catholics and Protestants
were more likely to marry Jews in Berlin than in Frankfurt. In support of the size
hypothesis, tigure 4 makes it clear that Catholic-Protestant marriage is stronger in
Frankfiirt than in Berlin. In addition, of all our six cities, the percentage of Protestants is
lowest in Vienna. According to tigure 4, in Vienna Protestants and Catholics less likely
marry each other than in our tive other cities. Contrary to the size hypothesis, this type of
intermarriage is most prevalent in Budapest.
Our hy~~othc.cis comt~urin~~ ul! re~li~~ion.~~ predicts a trend towards more Catholic-Protestant
marriage. Figure 4 indeed suggests a trend towards more Catholic-Protestant
intermarriage. However, it is not pronounced. Catholic-Protestant marriage gradually
increases in Berlin, Budapest, Frankfurt, and Riga. In Berlin and Frankfurt it also grows
during World War L These tindings fit. However, in Amsterdam the trend towards more
Catholic-Protestant marriage stops after World War l, to be followed by a trend towards
less intermarriage. ln Vienna, Catholic-Protestant marriage decreases only after World
War. Those results do not tully accord with our hypothesis comparing all religions.
Budapest has log odds ratios for Catholic-Protestant marriage below one, Frankfurt
somewhat above l, Berlin just under 2, Amsterdam above 2, Vienna between 3 and 4, and
Riga around 5. `These differences are robust; in tigure 4 only the lines for Riga and Vienna
cross one another. Figure 5 demonstrates that in all years and all places each form of
,lewish-Gentile intermarriage is less widespread than Catholic-Protestant marriage. There
is but one exception: Jcwish-Other inteniiarriage is more widespread than Catholic-
Protestant intermarriage until 1920 in Vienna. Given Austrian marriage laws, this finding
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is not unexpected. These findings confirm our hypothesis which proposes that Jewish-
Gentile marriage is less prevalent than Catholic-Protestant marriage.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION: QUESTIONS ON JEWISH-GENTILE
INTERMARRIAGE AND QUESTIONS ON THE DESTRUCTION OF
EUROPEAN JEWRY
Maintaining firstly that religion was a dimension of stratification in various European
countries in the first part of the 20`h century, secondly that persons of Jewish denomination
were more scorned than those of other faiths, and thirdly that intermarriage indicates
integration, this paper analyzed data on Jewish-Gentile intermarriage for Amsterdam,
Berlin, Budapest, Frankfurt, Riga, and Vienna in the years 1900-1940. In this way, it
addressed the question of the extent to which in years when Jewish-Gentile marriages de
jure were allowed these unions de fuclo occurred, and tested hypotheses explaining the
extent to which the right of Jews and Gentiles to marry each other, one part of full Jewish
and Gentile legal emancipation, actually was invoked.
To begin with, this paper found that until shortly before Nazism, marriages between
Jewish and Gentile persons were on the increase. This result supports the idea that, after
legal emancipation, integration in society was the destiny of Jewry. This corroboration is
the stronger given the finding of a weaker increase in and sometimes stable chances of
Catholic-Protestant intermarriage.
Secondly, the findings of this paper contradict the hypothesis that the longer ago the
Jewish persons living in a city were legally emancipated, the more the inhabitants of that
city were socially integrated. In this respect, the idea of integration as the destination of
Jewry after emancipation was not confirmed. A factor that better accounts for differences
between cities, is the extent of residential segregation within a city. A contributing factor is
the support for Zionism within a city. Given debates in theoretical sociology about
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opportunities and constraints versus desires and dislikes and about structure versus action,
we deem this finding of some importance.
Thirdly, this paper detected meager support for the hypothesis that the chances of
intermarriage decreased as the anti-Semitic vote rose. Although the Nazis first came to
power in Germany, there was no indication that in Berlin and Frankfurt-the German cities
with a large proportion of Jewish inhabitants-interman iage was less probable than in
cities with a sizable proportion of Jews outside of Germany. Intermarriage in Berlin and
Frankfurt decreased after Hitler came to power, not during the years the percentage of the
vote for the National Socialists increased. Jewish-Gentile intermarriage decreased in
Vienna after the Anschluss, not before it. In Budapest, it dropped after the First Jewish
Law of 1938, not earlier. Additionally, the likelihood ofmamages between Jews and
Gentiles in Amsterdam was stable during the 1930s.
Fourthly, we found some evidence on Jewish-Gentile intermarriage indicating that
Germany was exceptional and that politics influences intermarriage. To begin with, since
the early 1920 Jewish-Protestant marriage remained stable in Berlin and Jewish-Catholic
maniage in Berlin and Frankfurt, while both types of intermarriage increased in
Amsterdam, Budapest, and Vienna. In addition, in Amsterdam, Berlin, Budapest, and
Frankfurt, Jewish-Gentile marriage began to decrease before these marriages became
legally forbidden. However, in Berlin and Frankfurt Jewish-Gentile marriage did not
decrease before Hitler became chancellor, nor during rise in the National Socialist vote.
Lastly, the distinction between de jure emancipation and de, facto integration proved
useful. The inhabitants of our cities differed in their actual chances ofJewish-Gentile
marriage, and sometimes in unexpected ways. However, when stating and testing
hypotheses on differences between cities on the extent to which the right to intermarry
granted with legal emancipation is actually used, the limits of the available, at first sight
quite rich, material became obvious. Some auxiliary data were poor, mostly those for
Riga. Then, the data for the various cities were not always comparable. We could not use
one particular indicator for the degree to which a city's Jews were orthodox, but had to
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make do by shifting from one indicator to another. [n addition, there arose a need to go
from data pertaining to cities, to data for individuals. There is a difference between the
hypothesis that more intermarriage occurs in cities with more religiously mixed schools,
and the hypothesis that people who went to a city's religiously mixed schools were more
likely to intermarry. The latter proposition says more than the fonmer. This paper could not
test the more informative statement, underlining Goldthorpe's (1991) thesis of an
important difference between historical and sociological research.
Questions on Jewish-Gentile marriage belong to a range of logically related issues. We
finish by outlining their place in it. Bauman (1986, 1989) holds that although the question
of why the Holocaust occurred concerns sociology's central questions, it has received little
attention from sociologists. Bauman rejects theories which explain the decimation of
Jewry as an aberration on the path to modernity. These theories belittle the sociological
import of the Holocaust, which was "a characteristically modern phenomenon that cannot
be understood out of the context of cultural tendencies and technical achievements of
modernity (Bauman 1989, p. xiii)." Modern societies' bureaucratic structures were
necessary, though not sufficient, for this genocide. That opportunity was exploited by
racism (Bauman 1989, pp. 17-18). This racism was a form of social engineering matching
modern society's culture (Bauman 1989, p. 66).
We concur with Bauman's thesis that questions on `the war that Hitler won,' are important
sub-questions of sociology's main questions. Sociology is about inequalities and strife, and
the Holocaust is the extreme example of the degradation of human beings and the use of
violence. This paper addresses questions on the why's of the Holocaust in a roundabout
way. It does so by viewing the killing of Jews during World War II as the final stage in a
process of legal exclusion and social isolation, and by focusing an earlier phase in this
process. In this stage, the extent of intermaniage between ,lews and Gentiles might
factually decrease without intermarriage being legally forbidden.
Despite this agreement, we think that Bauman's thesis that sociology neglected the
Holocaust, is sometimes quite pertinent and sometimes not. It may apply to Elias' (1989)
48
assertion, that some queries on the Holocaust are more worthy of study than others, but
Bauman's argument bypasses the exchange between Adorno and Popper on the 1961
convention of the German Society for Sociology. Of course, Bauman's thesis is not
invalidated by recent sociological studies on genocide (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Fein
1990).
According to Elias, the main question raised by the mass murder in the name of the
German nation on Jewish men, women and children, is not this murder as such, but its
incompatibility with standards that are usually regarded as characteristic of contemporary
developed societies (Elias 1989, p. 394). The question is not only why in the second
quarter of the 20`~' century the standard of civilized conscience broke down in a highly
civilized people. That question pertains to the short term. In the Ancient World, there were
dozens of other ínstances of what now is called genocide (Elias 1989, pp. 45-46). The
question sociologists should address is that of why people after World War II could not
believe that such things had happened in a highly industrialized society (Elias 1989,
p. 395). Elias says that the question he set himself was that of describing and explaining
the development of a humanitarian standard that goes way beyond the standard of
Antiquity and makes its adherents react with spontaneous abhorrence to reports of Nazi
genocide (Elias 1989, p. 46). We agree with Bauman's implication that questions about
what happened on the way to and within the concentration camps, deserve more credit
than Elias appears to give them. How many people felt shame when Jewish-Gentile
marriages were outlawed? Why did contemporary people do the inconceivable?
Yet Bauman's thesis that sociology neglected the Holocaust ignores something important.
Popper's 1961 address to Germany's sociologists and Adorno's co-lecture were not on the
method by which sociology should tackle its questions, but about these questions
themselves. When depicting the difference between his position and that of Adorno,
Popper said that he believes that the world we live in is the best that ever existed, whereas
Adorno does not think so. Adorno (1962, pp. 141-142) replied that he indeed finds it
difficult to believe that there has been no world better than that which gave birth to
Auschwitz.
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This stalemate is broken by returning to Popper (1945) and Horkheimer and Adorno
(1947).3~ One of Popper's hypotheses was that social theorists who postulate in eversible
developments, are enemies of societies which accept that knowledge is fallible and that the
best do not always rule, and which for that reason encourage free discussion. Another of
Popper's hypotheses said that the acceptance in the 20`h century of such ideas on historical
destiny once propounded by Plato, Hegel, and Marx, had fostered the rise of the closed
societies of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Horkheimer and Adorno's book was steeped
in Hegelianism and Marxism. One of its arguments was that Mythos arises in
Enlightenment, and another maintained that anti-Semitism is part of this dialectic
development. Popper backed up his hypotheses with a detailed analysis of specific social
theories, Horkheimer and Adorno adorned theirs with obfuscating language. Perhaps, it
was not all that surprising that Adorno's appeal to upgrade questions on World War II to a
more important place in sociology did not have that much effect. Shortly after World War
II, Popper presented a more thorough analysis of them than Adorno. This is omitted from
the thesis that sociology overlooked the Holocaust.
With Bauman, we reject accounts ofthe Holocaust as an aberration on the path to
modernity. Such a tale does not improve a current theory, but turns it into one that fits too
easily. This is not to acquiesce to Bauman's theory that the Holocaust is a typical product
of modernity. We hold that there is more to modernity than bureaucracy, and that racism is
pre-modern social engineering.
The structure of contemporary societies display various features that, taken together, may
be termed modern. One is bureaucracy, and Bauman's account of the Holocaust highlights
this aspect. The separation of powers is another facet of modern social structure, and so is
a bill of rights. Were Jews killed while they were citizens, and the powers of the state were
'~ Bauman (1989, pp. I 52-153) effectively criticizes The Authnritarian Personality, but says that it
was produced by a group of scholars headed by Adorno. Bauman here misses the point that
Horkheimer and Adon~o in 1947 posed the problem ofthe triumph of the Nazis not as a question
of personalities, but as a question of trends in the development of ideas dominating societies.
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separated? When the Nazi's took over in Germany, they did away with the separation of
powers by introducing the Fuhrer-Prinzip,and one by one they withdrew rights from
German citizens. When occupying other countries, Nazi-Germany abolished the separation
of powers and deprived the Jewish inhabitants of these countries of their rights. However,
individual rights, the separation of powers and wars followed by occupations, play a
limited role in Bauman's theory that the Holocaust is a typical product of modernity.
As to the thesis that racism is a form of social engineering, with social engineering being
part of modern culture, it is good to remember Popper's (1945) distinction. One type of
social engineering tirst decides upon ultimate aims, and then employs the most efficient
means to actualize this blueprint. Popper calls this utopian engineering and holds that it
demands strong leadership making for a closed society. Another form focuses on concrete
social wrongs to be abated. It allows for a choice of ineans and changes in priorities.
Popper calls this piecemeal engineering and maintains that it thrives in societies with a
separation of powers and inhabitants having a bill of rights, in modern or open societies.
Bauman (1989, p. 66) says that "racism comes into its own only in the context of a design
of the perfect society and intention to implement the design through planned and
consistent effort." That is, racism is a form of utopian engineering and out of line with
modern culture.
Bauman (1989, p. 108) does state that in the years leading to the Final Solution, the most
trusted safeguards built into modern society's fabric had been put to a test, and that they all
failed. This proposition does not become much more informative when Bauman (1989,
p. 111) says that the original sin was the collapse or non-emergence of democracy. Is
theory formation in sociology on the Holocaust to stop after acknowledging the
importance of democracy?35 Bauman does not list checks and balances, nor explain why
they failed. The legal exclusion and social isolation ofJews in Europe during the fourth
and fifth decade of the 20`~' century went through several phases (Hilberg 1961), and these
stages deserve separate and detailed study. Perhaps big stories cannot be told, but short
`s Bauman (1991) may be understood as an attempt to balance this emphasis on one structural
factor. However, it praises Horkheimer and Adorno (1947), while neglecting Popper (1945).
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stories do not have to be as t~agmentary as Bauman's theory. Questions on the withdrawal
of the right of Jews and Gentiles to many each other, belong to questions on the fate of
Jewry in 20'h century Europe. One question on the transition trom one stage to another, is
to what extent a trend towards more Jewish-Gentile intermarriage increased the chances
that Gentiles married to Gentiles voted for an anti-Semitic party. If such a question
receives low priority, the notion that things happened as they were bound to happen may
be strengthened. This paper unearthed some evidence of lower de fucto Jewish-Gentile
marriage before renewed de jure~ exclusion of Jews during the 20`h century. One indication
was not found: around 1930, in six major European cities with a high proportion of Jews,
Jewish-Gentile intermarriage was as common in cities with strong as in those with weak
antí-Semitïsm.
EPILOGUE
Anne Frank, borne 1929 in Frankfurt and died in Bergen-Belsen 1945, had been living
since 1934 in Amsterdam when, in 1940, Germany occupied the Netherlands. In July
1942, she and her family-as Jews who did not accept things as they were bound to happen,
left their native country, and now were not prepared to follow deportation commands-
went into hiding. When underground, Anne kept a diary. It was published in 1947 as Het
uc'hterhuis.
Anne's November 10, 1942 entry, mentions a newcomer to The Buck House, a man she
names Alfred Dussel. Anne recounts that he is a dentist and has been living with a much
younger Christian woman, to whom he probably is not married. Other entries make it clear
that Dussel is a refugee from Germany and adheres more strongly than the Franks to
,lewish rites. Several of Annés entries refer in acrimonious terms to Dussel's behavior.
That of May l, 1943, mentions Dussel's birthday, notes that he received eggs, cognac,
oranges, and chocolates from his Charlotte, and contains Anne's reproach that he does not
share this food. On July 23, 1943, Anne surmises about the first activities of the
inhabitants of The Back House upon leaving it when the Dutch are liberated. Anne says of
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Dussel that he would know of nothing but his Charlotte. On June S, 1944, Anne tells of
tlirtations between Dussel and Mrs. Daan, another person hiding in The Back House. Her
June 16, 1944 entry says that Mrs. Daan is offended since Dussel barely responds to her
advances.
Who were Dussel and Charlotte? Were they married or not? If married, why did Dussel go
into hiding? The German occupiers of the Netherlands had exempted Jews in existing
mixed man iages from deportation dictates-did Dussel believe that this pardon was merely
temporary and that alertness implied going into hiding before the Germans once more
sharpened their practices? Or did Dussel and Charlotte live together out ofwedlock
because the German occupiers had forbidden entry into Jewish-Gentile marriage?
Dussel's real name was Fritz Pfeffer, born 1889 in Giessen, Germany, and died 1944 in
Neuengamme. In the l 920s, he married a Jewish woman; this marriage ended in 1932 in
divorce. In 1938, shortly after the Kristallnucht, Werner Pfeffer, the by then eleven year
old only child from this marriage, left Bremerhaven on a children's transport for
Southampton, to be met by Ernst Pfeffer, a brother of Fritz. Fritz Pfeffer, who had taken
care of his son after his divorce, did not take his son to the boat. That was considered too
dangerous. Werner was seen off by Charlotte Kaletta, a Catholic woman whom his father
had met in 1937 in Berlin, where both Fritz and Charlotte were living at that time. Fritz
and Charlotte were fearing the things that were bound to happen in Germany, and they
were wishing and planning for better times in a country whose citizens have more rights.
Charlotte Kaletta-born 1908 in Ilmengau, Germany; died 1985 Amsterdam-was divorced
from the Jewish dentist Ludwig Ldwenstein when she met Fritz Pfeffer. One child, a son
called Gustaf, issued from this marriage. A week after her trip to Bremerhaven, Charlotte
and Fritz were admitted to the Netherlands. There the Kri.rtullnach[ had resulted in 8,000
places for refugees from Austria and Germany. Charlotte's son stayed in Germany. She
could not take him with her, since his name had been entered into his father's passport.
S3
Charlotte Kaletta and Fritz Pfèffer tried to marry in the Netherlands, but failed. Charlotte
held German nationality. and when such a person wished to marry in the Netherlands,
according to a treaty concluded in 1908, German law applied. Since in Nazi-Germany
German Aryans were forbidden to marry Jews, Fritz and Charlotte could not contract a
marriage in the Netherlands. [n June 1939, Charlotte went to Belgium, to a friend of Fritz
that had gone from Berlin to Brussels, to find out what could be arranged there. She
returned having achieved nothing. It was not legislation issued by the German occupiers of
the Netherlands that prohibited a marriage between Charlotte Kaletta and Fritz Pfeffer.
This marriage did not take place because of adherence to existing rules by Dutch
authorities shortly before Germany occupied the Netherlands.
Charlotte Kaletta's tirst husband, like Fritz Pfeffer's first wife, did not survive World War
II. Neither did Charlotte's son. Anne Frank's diary was staged in Amsterdam's Municipal
Theater during the 1956I1957 season, and this play did not portray Dussel in a favorable
light. Charlotte went to see it, as may be inferred from her personal belongings. These
were found accidentally in 1987, on Amsterdam's once largely Jewish flea market the
Watcrlnoplein, by a staff inember of the Anne Frank Foundation. Amidst pictures of
Charlotte and Fritz, was a copy of the play's program and a bundle ofclippings on Anne
Frank's diary. Charlotte Kaletta never spoke publicly about her life.;~'
'`' The tinding of Charlotte Kaletta's belongings was reported in the Dutch newspaper NRC-
Hunclc~l.chlcul of November 7, 1987. V~n der 7.ee (1990) construc[s, on the basis of this finding
and other materials, a ~ isit to Charlotte Kaletta during which Charlotte tells the story of her life.
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APPENDIX ON DATA SOURCES
Data on denominational intermarriage:
Amsterdam
Statistisch jaarboek der gemeente Amsterdam, various years.
Berlin
Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin, various years.
Missing years for Berlin were taken from:
Die Geburten, Eheschliessungen und .Sterbefdlle im FreistaatPreussen wáhrend des Jahres
19xx, various years."
Buda~est
Statistisch-administratives Jahrbuchder Haupt- und Residenzstadt Budapest, various years.
Missing figures for Budapest were obtained from:
Monatsheft des Budapester Kommunalstatistischen-Bureaus.
Frankfurt
Statistisches Handbuch der Stadt Frankfurt am Main, various years.
Tabellarische Ubersichten betreffend den Zivilstand der Stadt Frankfurt am Main im Jahre
19xx, various years.
Ri~a
Statistisches Jahrbuch der S[adl Rigu, various years.
Handruck. Riga.c naturliche Be~v~ilkerungsbewegung 191 J-1930. Riga, Verdffentlichungen des
statistischen Amtes der Stadt Riga, 1932.
Vienna
Statistisches Jahrbuchder Sludt Wien, various years.
Die Bewegung der óev~lkerung in den Jahren 1914 bis 1921. Wien, Beitr~ge zur Statistik der
Republik ~sterreich, 8. Heft, 1923.
Statistisches Handbuch fur die Repuhlik Osterreich, various years.
;' We saw to it that the enlargement of the city of Berlin after World War l did not affect
tigures by taking data on the Stadtkreis rather than the Stadt Berlin from older sources
Appendix 1
Uata on residential segrcgation:
Amsterdam
J. Vijgen. Joden in Amsterdum, A.c.cimilutie en .ti~egregatie vun een etnische minderheid 1600-
1930. Doktoraalskriptie socíale geografie, Vakgroep Stad 8r. Land, Universiteit van
Amsterdam, 1983 (unpublished, figures for Amsterdam 1906).
Bureau voor Statistiek der Gemeente Amsterdam. "De resultaten der volks- en beroepstelling
van 31 december 1920." .S~utisti.cche mededeeling no. 72. Amsterdam, Muller, 1924; pp. 30-
32.
Bureau voor Statistiek der Gemeente Amsterdam. "De bevolking van Amsterdam Deel [L De
urtkomsten der tienjaarlijksche Volkstellingen van 1830 tot 1930." Stutistische mededeeling
no. 100. Amsterdam, Meulenhoff, 1934, pp. 26-28.
.4msterdum gedurende den Twcede Wereldonrlog. Stutistisch Jaurboek der Gemeente
Ant.tiverdum 1940-19-í-1, pp. 71-72.
Berlin
Stutistisches Juhrbuch der .Slad~ óerlin, various years.
l3erlin in Zuhlen. Taschenbuch 19~15 (figures for 1939).
Buda~est
Die funf igjárige Entrvicklung Bi~dupest.ti~ 1H73-1923. Publicationen des Statistischen Amtes der
Haupt- und Residenzstadt Budapest, nr. 53.
Statistisches Juhrhuch der Huupl- und Rcsidenzstudt Budapest, various years.
Frankfurt
For figures on Frankfurt, see Gley (1936).
Ri~a
Statistisches Juhrbuch der Studt Riga, various years.
Vienna
Statisti.cche.c Juhrbuch fiir die~ Republik Osterreich 1925 ( figures for Vienna in 1923).
,Statisti.cches Juhrbuch der .Stadt Wien, various years.
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Data on educational segregation:
Amsterdam
Statistisch Jaarboek der Gemeente Amsterdam, various years.
Berlin
Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin, various years.
Budapest
Statistisches Juhrbuch der Huupt- und Residenzstudt Budupest, various years.
Vienna
Statistisches Juhrbuch der Stud[ Wien, various years.
Data on Jewish orthodoxy within a city:
Amsterdam
Verslag van den Toestand der Nederlandsch-Lsruèlitische Hoofdsynagoge te Amsterdam,
various years.
Jaarboek van 5674 ( 1913-1914) uitgegeven door de Centrale organisatie voor de religieuze en
moreele verheffing der Joden in Nederland.
Berlin
Jiidische.c Jahrbuchfiir Gros.c-Berlin 192H.
Budapest
Statistisch-administrative.c Jahrhuchder Haupt- und Residenzstadt Budupest 1926, p. 431.
Vienna
Jiidisches Jahrbuch fiir C)sterreich 5693.
Time series on shekel payers:
Stenol;raphisches Protokoll der VerhandlunKen de.c XIX. Zionistenkongresses und der vierten
Tagung des Counci! der Jewi,ch Agency fiir Pulustinu, Luzern, 20. Augu.c[ bis 6. September
1935. Wien, Fiba Verlag, 1937, pp. 18-19.
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Figures on gifts to the Jewish National Fund:
Berrchl de.c Acliun,c-C~nnllle.5' c{cY ZlUl1l,4ÍLS'Chen OYKGl1lsUlloi) Un L{en Zehnlcn Kongre.i's, 9. bl.S'
I5. Augu,S'~ 1911. No place, no year, p. I I.
I3ericht c{e.c Acliorls-('onlilé,c der Zionislischen Or~,~unisalion un den XL Kongress, Wien, 2. bis
9. .Septen~ber, 1913. No place, no year, p. 12.
Data on elections:
Budapest
The 1939 vote for the Arrow Cross Party in Budapest was found in:
Stulistisches.lahrhuch der H(n~pl- und Rc,ciderrzslad~ 13udupest, 19~12, p. 160.
Other election data were found in other instalhnents of this yearbook.
Ri~a
Election data for Riga were taken from the statistical yearbook for this city.
Vienna
Various official publications provided the elections results for Vienna.
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TABLE I
NUMBER OI~ INIIABfI'ANTS Wffli JtiWISFI DENOMINATION, TOTAL NUMBER OF INIIABITANTS, AND
PERCENTAGE OP JfiWISI I INI IABITANTS; SIX EUROPEAN CI"1'IES, CIRCA 1900-CIRCA 1940
Number of inhabitants Total number of Percentage ofJewish
City Year with Jewish denomination inhabitants inhabitants
Amsterdam 1899 59,065 510,853 11.60~0
1909 60,970 566,13 I 10.8oro
I 920 68,758 683,166 ]0.4oro
1930 65,558 768,409 8.7oro
I 941' 79,497 795,170 10.0oro
Berlin 1900 108,044 2,481,084 4.40~0
' 1910 144,043 3,734,258 3.9oro
I 925 172,672 4,024,165 4.3oro
1933 160,564 4,242,501 3.8oro
1939 78,713 4,32 I,521 1.8oro
Budapest 1900 166,198 703,448 23.6oro
1910 203,687 880,37I 23.1oro
1920 215,512 928,996 23.2oro
1930 204,371 1,006,184 20.3oro
194 I I 84,453 1,164,963 15.8oro
Frankfurt 1900 21,974 288,989 7.60~0
1910 26,228 414,576 6.3oro
1925 29,385 467,520 6.3oro
1933 26,158 555,857 4.7oro
1939' I 4,46 I 553,464 2.óoro
Riga 1897 21,679 255,879 8.Soro
1913 33,096 497,586 ó.óoro
1920 24,887 185, I 37 13.4oro
1925 39,443 337,699 11.7oro
1930 41,844 377,917 ll.loro
1935 43,558 385,063 11.3oro
Vienna 1900 146,926 1,674,957 8.80~0
I910 175,3 I 8 2,03 I,498 8.6oro
I923 20I ,5 I 3 I,865,780 10.8oro
I 934 176,034 1,874,130 9.4oro
I 939 82,077 I,912,608 4.3oro
~` not denominational, but racial definition (full and three-quarter Jewish).
Sources: census as reported in the statistical yearbooks of the respective cities.
Tables 1
'fA6~,1-.2
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City
(3)
Year of unrestricted Year in which the
Year of equal Jewish-Gentile legal status of Jews






Amsterdam I 796 I 809 I 940 1942
Berlin I 850 I 875 I 933 1935
Budapest 1867 1895 1920 and 1938 1941
Frankfurt 1864 187ï 1933 1935
Riga 1919 1919 1934 ??




THE RELATION BETWEEN THE DENOMINATION OF BRIDES AND THE DENOMINATION OF GROOMS; NUMBERS FOR ALL MARRIAGES
CONCLUDED IN 193 I IN SIX EUROPEAN CITIES
Amsterdam Berlin
Groom





1,828 442 48 562
535 881 29 211
16 19 455 39






Prot. Cath. Jewish Other
23,154 2,656 285 3,377
2,406 1,488 40 464
112 21 913 59
730 106 72 2,228
2,865 1,550 560 1,286 6,261
Budapest Frankfurt
Groom





611 1,103 86 58
1,325 4,740 296 155
82 225 I ,623 13











26,402 4,271 1,310 6,128 38,111
Groom
Prot. Cath. Jewish Other
1,820 730 18 149
828 900 15 57
22 4 133 9
33 13 5 77













2,359 130 3 174
190 388 0 89
5 1 376 1





2,756 573 382 553 4,264
Tables 3
Groom
Prot. Cath. Jewish Other
773 183 15 40
181 10,483 89 167
I 3 42 1,227 98





988 10,775 1,417 2,686 15,866
TABLE 4
RI-:SII)IiN~I~InL SI~:GRI :Gn~llt )N OP GI:N"I~II.I:S AND 1EWS IN SIX EUROPEAN Cl~l( S IN Tf IF. I:IRS"T PART OF
I I IL 20"i CF;NTURY
City Year and segregation index
Amsterdam
Berlin
I906 1920 1930 1941
S6 S3 40 SO
I910 1925 1933 1939






1913 1920 1925 I930 I935
49 4S SO SI S2
Vienna
I900 1910 1920 1930 1941
33 30 28 28
1900 1910
3S 40
1900 1910 1923 1934 1939





OVERALL JEWISH-GENTILE INTERMARRIAGE iN THE FIRST THREE DECADES OF THE 2OTM CENTURY IN SIX EUROPEAN CITIES,








(3) (4) (5) (6) ~~) ~8)
Residential Educational Orthodox Political anti- Jewish-Gentile
segregation segregation Judaism Zionism Semitism marriages
Amsterdam 1 1 6 5 1 2 1 4
Berlin 2 2-3 2 3 4 3 5 2
Budapest 4 4 1 2 2 1 4 1
Frankfurt 3 2-3 3 4 5 4 6 3
Riga 6 6 5 6 6 6 2 6
Vienna 5 5 4 1 3 5 3 5
1- longest, 1-longest, 1- least, 1- least, 1- least, 1-1east, 1-lowest, 1- highest,
6- shortest 6- shortest 6- most 6- most 6- most 6- most 6- highest 6- lowest
period period segregation segregation orthodoxy Zionism frequency prevalence
Sources: see text and tables 2, 4, and 7.
~rABtJr: tí
CI IANC ~I a IN JI:WItiI I-GI`N I II.I: IN I I KMAItItIM ~I[ IN I I II: Flltti f I I Iltl'.I[ I)I :c'AI)I;ti ~)I ll ll: 20~~~ C'I[N fl1KY IN SIX








Decrease in Increase in Increase in Jewish-
residential political anti- Gentile
segregation Semitism intermarriage
Amsterdam I 1 2 3
Berlin I 5 5 5
Budapest I 2 4 4
Frankfurt I 6 6 6
Riga 2 4 1 1
Vienna 2 3 3 2
I- before, I- strongest I- weakest, 1- strongest
2- after 1900 decrease, 6- strongest 6- weakest
ó - strongest increase increase
increase
Sources: see text and tables 2 and 4
Tables 6
TABLE 7
LOG ODDS RATIOS FOR J~wISI I-PRO"I'ESTANT, JEWISH-CATHOLIC AND JEWISH-OTI~IER INTFRMARRIAGE; SIX El!R(~I'~AN CIllES 1930-1943
City 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943
Jewish-Protestant intermarriage
Amsterdam 6.3 7.0 6.4 6.6 6.-1 6.3
Berlin 6.2 6.5 6.3 6.4 8.1 8.7
Budapest 4.8 5.0 4.9 5.0 ~.0 ~.0
Frankfurt 6.6 6.4 6.9 6.7 8.3 10.1
Ri~~a 10.7 I 1.0 I 1.0 10.9 10.8 " 11.0














6.4 8.0 1 L 1 ~
. . . .




Amsterdam 7.0 6.6 6.4 6.5 6.2 6.8 7.1 6.6 6.7 7.0 7.3 8.3 11.3
Berlin 6.7 7.4 7.0 " 7.0 8.7 9.0 i `` 12.4 13.7 ~ ~.. ~.,
Budapest 4.8 4.8 4.7 49 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.8 5.3 6.0 6.6




Rioa oo cc 10.1 ~c 11.5 11.4 10.4 w 11.5 ~ ~ ~ ' '
Vienna ~ 8.0 7.6 0 . 7.7 7S 7.6 ~"" 12.5 I2.9 12.1 ~~ ~`
Jewish-Other intermarriage
Amsterdam 5.6 5.3 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.5 5.3 5.7 5.7 5.1 6.0 8.3 9.7~ -.
Berlin 6.2 6.2 5.8 6.3 7.5 , 8.2 iU.B 10.8 10.0 .
Budapest 5.4 5.4 5.5 ~.0 6.0 ~.I ~.h ~.~; 5.4 6.5 6.5 6.8 ~~~ 7.7
Frarilcfurt 7.8 5.4 5.7 6.5 7.6 ; ~ ~ ~ ' oo ~
' ~ ' '
Riga 10.8 ] 0.5 9.8 8. ~ 8.6 ~ 9.4 8.8 9.1 ~ ~ ~ ~ '
Vienna ~ 5.7 5.7 ~ ~ ~.4 ~.l 4.9 ~ 10.0 i0.1 9.6 ~ ~
Legal position ofJews begins to deteriorate 'x `-; ! Jewish-Gentile intermarriage becomes forbidden
. missino data x complete closure Sources: see Appendix
TABLE 8
TI IF. RANKING O1' SIX EUROPGAN CI I'IIiS AI:I1:R "I IIF;IR I:XTIiNT OF CATIIOUC-JtiWISI I, JfiWISH-OTHER AND
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